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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For many years, a great deal of conflict and
closed-minded bias has existed between the traditional
intrapsychic and behavioral orientations in psychology.
The former group tended to focus almost exclusively on
internal determinants of behavior, while the latter group
emphasized external factors.

However, contemporary psy-

chology appears to be moving towards a significant change
in perspective.

There appears to be more open communica-

tion between the two groups.

Whether this more open com-

munication will lead to a rapprochement between the two
viewpoints (Wachtel, 1977) or to a dialectical synthesis
of the two (Kanfer, 1979), is not clear.

What is clear is

that a new paradigm appears to be emerging.
While this emerging viewpoint has been called a
cognitive-behavioral perspective, it has not congealed into
a definite paradigm with clearly delimited parameters
(Mahoney, 1977).

Despite this lack of clarity, one rela-

tionship has been repeatedly stressed.

Many authors from

different perspectives have suggested a complex interdependence between environmental, behavioral, cognitive,
1
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and biological variables (see Bandura, 1977; Bowers, 1973;
Endler & Magnusson, 1975; Marchenbaum, 1977; Perls, 1973;
Wachtel, 1977).
The nature of this complex system is such that a
significant interaction between people's beliefs and their
behavior (see Bandura & Barab, 1971; Baron, Kaufman, &
Stauber, 1969; Estes, 1972; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp, 1966)
as well as between interpersonal behavior and environmental
responses (see Bell, 1968, 1971; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970;
Patterson, 1975; Raush, 1965; Thomas & Martin, 1976) have
been consistently found.

In other words, people's beliefs

influence their behavior, their behavior influences their
environment, and their environment influences their beliefs
and behavior.
Given these complex interdependent relationships,
the question of the nature of the change process comes to
mind.

While it seems logical to assume that changes in one

subsystem of this complex network might facilitate changes
in other subsystems.

It is also equally possible that

changes in one subsystem may be inhibited by other subsystems.

Clinical examples of the latter have indicated

that when many people who have been hospitalized with emotional problems recover, and return to their previous environment, they often revert to their former patterns
(Haley, 1963).
In answer to the question on the nature of the
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change process, many authors (see Bertalanffy, 1968; Haley,
1963, 1973, 1976; Horowitz, 1973; Marris, 1974; Palazzoli,
Boscolo, Cechin, & Prata, 1978; Watzlawich, Weakland, &
Fisch, 1974) have suggested that lasting change is not
automatic and that there appears to be systematic forces of
checks and balances which influence and are an integral
part of the change process.

In other words, change is not

automatic; there is likely to be some resistance.
Given, again, this network of interdependent relationships and the ecological nature of the change process,
the present study attempts to probe and explore this network as well as the dynamics of change.

Specifically, this

study examines the relationships between three elements
within the individual's belief system (i.e., InternalExternal Locus of Control; Dogmatism; and Self-Esteem};
the relationship between the belief system and behavior
(i.e., interpersonal skills); and the relationship between
behavior change and the belief system.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Three Components of Belief
Rokeach (1968) has stated that a "belief system may
be defined as having represented within it, in some
organized psychological but not necessarily logical form,
each and every one of a person's countless beliefs about
physical and social reality"

(p. 2).

Given that by defini-

tion the belief system represents the totality of an individual's beliefs, Internal-External Locus of Control (I-E},
Dogmatism (Dg) , and Self-Esteem (S-E} may be thought of as
three aspects or components of a person's belief system.
While these three aspects of belief are not exhaustive,
they may be considered as representative samples of the
state of a person's belief system.
The first component of belief to be examined is
locus of control.
groups of people

Rotter (1966) distinguishes between two
on the I-E continuum, "externals" who

perceive reinforcements as dependent on luck or others and
"internals" who perceive reinforcements as contingent upon
what they do.

He states that
4
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the individual is selective in what aspects of his
behavior are repeated or strengthened and what aspects
are not depending upon his own perception of the nature
or causality of the relationship between the reinforcement and the preceding behavior • • • • If a person perceives a reinforcement as contingent upon his own behavior, then the occurrence of either a positive or
negative reinforcement will strengthen or weaken
potential for that behavior to recur in the same or
similar situation.
If he sees the reinforcement as
being outside his own control or not contingent, that
is depending upon chance, fate, powerful other, or
unpredictable circumstances, then the preceding behavior is less likely to be strengthened or weakened
(p.

5) •

Given this difference in expectancy, Rotter believes that externals will tend to develop and adapt poorly
to their environment, while internals will tend to learn
more adaptive behavior and become more aubonomous.

If this

generalization is valid, it would seem that people are
handicapped by an external belief.
Parenthetically, Bandura (1977) also believes that
expectancies play a critical role in differences in behavior.

However, he distinguishes between what he calls

"efficacy expectations" and "outcome expectations."

The

former represents the individual's belief that he or she
may be able to perform some behavior, while the latter
represents the individual's belief that a given behavior
will lead to certain outcomes.

Bandura characterizes locus

of control as primarily concerned with causal beliefs about
action-outcome contingencies rather than with personal
efficacy.

However, while he believes that causal belief

and self-efficacy are different phenomena, he also thinks
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that causal ascriptions of behavior to skill or chance can
rr.ediate the effects of performance on self-efficacy.

In

:>ther words, while these two beliefs are different, they
are interrelated.
Although Bandura has made important theoretical
refinements, this study will deal with locus of control and
not with his distinctions.
Familial Antecedents of
Locus of Control
The question arises as to the origins of this difference in expectancies.

These differences can, in part,

be accounted for in the developmental histories of internals and externals.

The research seems to indicate that

internals and externals were exposed to significantly different child-rearing practices.
Chance (1965) matched children's scores on Crandall's Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Questionnaire (an internal-external scale) with their mother's attitudes towards child rearing.

The author found that in-

ternal control expectancies were related to permissive and
flexible maternal attitudes and expectations of early independence.
Katovsky, Crandall, and Good (1967) also compared
children's scores on the Crandall scale with some observations of parental behavior and attitudes.

Their findings

indicated that internal control expectancies were related
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to parental protectiveness, nurturance, and the tendency to
be approving and non-rejecting.

Conversely, parental be-

haviors such as dominance, rejection, and criticalness were
negatively associated with beliefs in internal control.
The researchers further noted that the largest number of
significant results were obtained from behavioral observations and not with expressed parental attitudes.
Davis and Phares (1969) also found that parents of
internals were judged as being more accepting, less rejecting, having greater positive involvement, and exercising
less hostile control than parents of externals.

Also,

parents of internals were perceived as being more consistent disciplinarians than were the parents of externals.
One other significant finding of the authors was that there
were no significant differences between the expressed
attitudes of parents of internals and externals.

The dif-

ference was in their actual parenting behaviors.
MacDonald (1971), using a large sample of college
students, found that internality was positively correlated
with perceived parental nurturance and consistency in maintaining standards for behavior.
Finally, Epstein and Komcrita (1971) used a sample
of Black children and found that external attribution of
success in a matching task was positively correlated with
inconsistent parental discipline and hostile control.
To summarize, the research seems to consistently
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indicate that internals tend to come from warm, accepting
homes with predictable standards and consistent discipline
coupled with nurturance.

Externals, on the other hand,

tend to come from homes characterized as being higher in
the use of physical punishment, overprotection, affective
punishment, and generally inconsistent discipline.
Finally Davis and Phares (1969) found that, while
the parents of internal and external children may have
similar attitudes toward child rearing, their actual child
rearing behaviors differed significantly.

One might there-

fore speculate that this difference in parental behavior
may be reflecting the control orientations of the parent
themselves.
Sociological Factors and
Locus of Control
In addition to familial antecedents, there are
definite indications that minority group status, socioeconomic status, and level of education, also play a role
in the differing expectations of internals and externals.
In one study, Battle and Rotter (1963) used the
"Children's Picture Test of Internal-External Control,"
a projective task, the Bealer I-E (Internal-External)
scale, and a live-matching task with eighty black and white
children from middle and lower class families.

The authors

found that lower-class blacks were more external than middle class black or whites and that middle class children
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were, in general, more internal than lower class children.
In another study, Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965a) investigated differences between blacks and whites in their
control expectancies.

The subjects were compared on three

different I-E sclaes and a pertinent performance task.
Blacks were found to be significantly more external than
whites.

The authors suggested that because of societal

factors (for instance, discrimination) a large portion of
the externality of blacks could be attributed to blacks'
dubiousness about avenues open to them rather than doubts
about their own adequacy.
Several other researchers have also found that middle class children are more internal than lower class children (Gruen and Ottinger, 1969); that educational level is
directly related to internality (Walls and Miller, 1970);
and that socioeconomic status and objective access to
societal opportunities is positively related to internality
(Jessor, Graves, Hanson, and Jessor, 1968).
To summarize, the research indicates that social
factors also play a significant role in control expectations, with membership in socially disadvantaged groups
correlating positively with externality.
Miscellaneous Differences
J.n I-E
Numerous studies have indicated significant differences between people maintaining internal vs. external
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beliefs in control.

These have included:

achievement be-

havior (Coleman et al., 1966; McGhee & Crandall, 1968;
Harrison, 1968; Nowicki & Roundtree, 1971), attitude change
(Ritchie & Phares, 1969; Ryckman, Rodda & Sherman, 1972;
McGinnies & Ward, 1974; Sherman, 1973; Snyder & Larson,
1972), birth control practices (Bauman & Udry, 1972; Lundy,
1972; MacDonald, 1970), cognitive awareness (Lefcourt &
Wine, 1969; Lefcourt, 1967; Lefcourt, Lewis & Silverman,
1968; DuCette & Wolk, 1973; Wolk & DuCette, 1974), information seeking (Seeman, 1963; Seeman & Evans, 1962; Davis &
Phares, 1967; Phares, 1968; Williams & Stark, 1972), perceptual sensitivity (Getter, 1966; Rothschild & Horowitz,
1970; Ude & Vogler, 1969), resistance to subtle influence
(Gore, 1962; Biondo & MacDonald, 1971), and social conformity (Crowne & Liverant, 1963; Tolor, 1971).
Pines and Julian (1972) have interpreted some of
these differences as reflecting different strategies used
by internals and externals to reach important goals.

They

suggest that an internal strategy may be characterized as
being responsive to the informational demands of a task
while an external strategy may be characterized as being
oriented towards the social demands of the situation.
Overall, these differences indicate that people
with an internal orientation tend to exhibit better learning and acquisition of material, actively seek information,
are more alert and attentive and evidence greater attempts
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at self-mastery than people with a more external orientation.

On the other hand externals tend to be more easily

influenced by others and conform more to societal pressures
than internals.
Locus of Control and
Maladjustment
Several studies have dealt with control orientation
as a measure of emotional adjustment.

Distefano, Pryer,

and Smith (1971) administered the I-E scale to normal
adolescents, psychiatric patients, and normal adults.

They

found that there was a significant linear relationship of
increasing internality as a function of increasing age in
the adolescent group.

In addition to this, they noted that

the psychiatric group scores were more extreme in either
direction than those of the adult group.

The authors sug-

gest that perception of control is relevant to both normal
development and emotional adjustment.
The research of Smith, Pryer, and Distefano (1971)
also indicates the relationship between emotional adjustment and locus of control.

They compared the I-E scores

with behavioral ratings of thirty mildly and thirty
severely emotionally disturbed hospitalized psychiatric
patients.

The authors found that the severely emotionally

impaired patients were significantly more external than the
mildly disturbed patients.
A similar study by Lottman and DeWolfe (1972) found
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that process schizophrenics (a poor premorbid adjustment)
were significantly more external than reactive schizophrenics (good premorbid adjustment) •

The authors suggest

that these differences in expectancies to be a function of
long-term learning and not simply current symptoms.
In addition to these, numerous other studies have
consistently found a positive relationship between externality and maladjustment and anxiety (see Joe, 1971;
Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1976).

However, while severity of

psychopathology appears to be related to externality as
suggested by Shybut (1968), other studies have indicated
that not all diagnostic groups are externally oriented.
Harrow and Ferrante (1969) administered the Rotter
scale to a group of psychiatric patients during the first
week of their hospitalization and again after six weeks.
The authors found that the schizophrenic group was significantly more external than the other groups.

At the

other extreme, the manic group was extremely internal, with
depressives and character disorders scoring between the two
extremes.

When subjects were retested, there was a non-

significant shift towards internality in the schizophrenic
group.

There was, however, a significant shift towards in-

ternality in the non-schizophrenic groups as well as a
shift towards a more normal locus of control (i.e., less
extreme internality) with the manic group.
In regards to depression, severalcorrelational
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studies have found a significant relationship between externality and self-report measures of depression (see
Calhoun, Cheney, & Davis, 1974; Naditch, Gargen, & Michael,
1975; Warehime & Foulds, 1971).

In addition to this, and

in support of Seligman's (1975) position on "learned helplessness," Hiroto (1974) found that external beliefs,
chance conditions and

inescapable pretreatment learning

all retard the development of escape behavior.
However, while it appears that externality and depression are related, Phares (1978) cautions that it is impossible to "assert with confidence that depression relates
to an external orientation and is unrelated to internal
beliefs" (p. 286).

He suggests that a variety of factors

may be confounding this relationship, including the potentially pessimistic wording of external items (Lamont, 1972),
the possible relationship between internality and social
desirability, as well as possible differences between assuming responsibility for failures and successes.

Further-

more, he suggests that defensive externals (who act like
internals while espousing external beliefs) may seriously
distort the relationship between depression and externality.
Similarly, the relationship between I-E and
alcoholism and drug abuse is far from clear-cut.

While

Norwicki and Hopper (1974) and Palmer (1971) reported that
alcoholics or heavy drinkers were found to be externally
oriented.

Goss and Morosko (1970) found that a sample of
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262 alcoholic outpatients were significantly more internal
than Rotter's (1966) general norms.

Similar results were

reported in the above-mentioned study by Distefano et al
(1971) as well as by Gozali and Sloan (1971).
In a comparative study between narcotics users and
college students, Bergins and Ross (1973) found that the
drug users had significantly more internal I-E scores than
the college sample.

However, these differences may have

been due to a lack of adequate matching between groups (see
Phares, 1976).

In fact, Strassberg and Robinson (1974)

found that among a group of drug users those who had a more
external orientation were also considered more maladjustea.
Phares (1976) has suggested that the apparent contradiction in results between alcoholic groups may be due
to chronic alcoholics having a history of participation in
treatment programs that reinforce the espousal of internal
attitudes.

However, Berzins and Ross (1973) have suggested

that "internal control can additionally be conceptualized
as a consequence or by-product of substance abuse.

Perhaps

a term such as 'pseudo-internality' should be used to distinguish drug-engendered internality from its conventional,
socially learned counterpart"

(p. 90).

Related to this, Lefcourt (1976) has stated that
"alcoholics and drug addicts often are known to deny the
fact that they have become dependent upon a drug.

It is,

consequently, not accidental that an important element in
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recovery for both alcoholics and drug addicts is the open
admission of addiction.

Perhaps the more internal re-

sponses of these addicts reflect a tendency to deny the
very helplessness or slavishness to the drug in question
that is so evident to everyone but the addict himself"
(p. 92).

While these differences do not refute Shybut's
argument that severity of psychopathology is related to
externality, they may indicate that different diagnostic
groups would require different treatment approaches, depending on their control orientation (some tentative support for this comes from Abramowitz, Abramowitz, Roback &
Jackson, 1974; Friedman & Dies, 1974; Helweg, 1974; Jacobson, 1974; Kilman, Albert, & Sotile, 1975).

Furthermore,

while the data on I-E and adjustment tends to support
Rotter's hypothesis that people are handicapped by an external orientation, because a great deal of the data is
correlational, it is difficult to tell whether externality
leads to maladjustment or vice-versa.

Finally, it seems

likely that those diagnostic groups that might be called
"pseudo-internal," may also be handicapped by their own
denial of their difficulties.
In other words, while it seems highly probable that
people are likely to be handicapped by an external belief
system, it also seems likely that in some situations an
internal orientation may be a handicap.

16
Dogmatism:
Mind

Open Mind, Close

The second component of belief systems to be discussed is dogmatism.

In his seminal work on dogmatism,

Rokeach (1960) articulated his theoretical position on the
nature of cognitive structure.

He suggested that all of a

person's beliefs may be organized into two interdependent
parts--a belief system and a disbelief system.

The belief

system consisting of "all the beliefs, sets, expectancies,
or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, that a person at
a given time accepts as true of the world"

(p. 33) •

While

the disbelief system consists of "a series of subsystems
rather than merely a single one, and contains all the disbeliefs, sets, expectancies, conscious and unconscious,
that, to one degree or another, a person at a given time
rejects as false"

(p. 33) •

Rokeach suggests that the belief-disbelief dimension has several additional properties.

These include:

isolation, the degree of communication among beliefs; differentiation, the extent of articulation or richness of
detail; and comprehensiveness, the range or total number of
disbelief systems.
In addition to this, he suggests that there are
levels of belief within the system.

These levels include:

the most central region which deals with the person's
"primitive beliefs" about the nature of the physical world,
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social reality, and the nature of the self; the intermediate region which deals with the person's beliefs regarding positive and negative authority in his or her life;
and, the peripheral region which contain the individual's
"derived" beliefs which emanate from acceptance of various
authorities (see Rokeach, 1968, for a slight revision of
this structural organization) .
The nature of this central-peripheral dimension is
such that central beliefs are most resistant to change and
peripheral beliefs are easiest.to change.

Furthermore, a

change in a central belief will result in greater systemic
change within the belief system than a change in any other
level of belief.
From these basic dimensions, Rokeach proposed differential relationships among dimensions to distinguish
between the open and closed mind.

He characterized a sys-

tem as closed (the person characterized as dogmatic) to the
extent that "there is a high degree of rejection of all
disbelief subsystems, an isolation of beliefs, a high discrepancy in degree of differentiation between belief and
disbelief systems, and little differentiation within the
disbelief system" (p. 61).
Futhermore, he assumes that "the more closed the
system, the more will the world be seen as threatening, the
greater will be the belief in absolute authority, the more
will other persons be evaluated according to the authorities
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they line up with, and the more will peripheral beliefs be
rela1:ed to each other by virtue of their common origin in
authority, rather than by virtue of intrinsic connections"
(p. 62).

Conversely, a system may be characterized as being
open, "where rejection of disbeliefs is low; where there
is a communication among beliefs and between beliefs and
disbeliefs; where there is little discrepancy in the degree
of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems;
and where there is a relatively high degree of differentiation within the disbelief system" (Erlich, 1978, p. 136).
Additionally, "the world is seen to be a more
friendly place by the relatively open person.

He should

thus be more free and more impervious to irrelevant pressures.

For him, the power of authority is still there, but

depends upon the authority's cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he has about
the world"

(Rokeach, 1960, p. 63).

Finally, and similarly to Marris (1974), Rokeach
believes that the cognitive structure serves two powerful
and conflicting motives--the need to know or understand and
the need to protect or ward off threats.

He states that

to the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant and the need to ward off threat absent, open
systems should result.
In the service of the cognitive
need to know, external pressures and irrational internal drives will often be pushed aside, so that information received from outside will be discriminated, assesed, and acted on according to the objective require-
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ments of the situation. But as the need to ward off
threat becomes stronger, the cognitive need to know
should become weak<ar, resulting in more closed belief
systems. Under threat, information and source should
become inseparable and should be evaluated arbitrarily
in line with the rewards and punishments meted out by
authority (p. 68.
It can be seen that Rokeach's conceptualization has
some definite parallels with Rotter's I-E distinctions.
However, internality and open-mindedness as well as externality and closed-mindedness are not identical.

Despite

this, it does seem likely that a person is likely to be
handicapped with a dogmatic or closed belief system.
Antecedents of the Open and
Closed Mind
As with the I-E literature, several studies indicate significant differences in the backgrounds of people
with

open vs. closed belief systems.

Rokeach and Kemp

(1960) found very significant correlations between dogmatism and anxiety among various samples from the United
States and England.

In addition to this, the authors found

that the more dogmatic subjects reported a significantly
higher incidence of childhood anxiety indicators (i.e.,
thumb-sucking, nail-biting, nightmares, etc) than the more
open-minded subjects.
In a replication of this study, Hanson and Clune
(1973) with a sample of seventh and eighth grade students
also found a significant difference in the number of
anxiety indicators reported by high vs. low dogmatic
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subjects.

While these two studies support the hypothesis

that dogmatism may be a defense against anxiety, the question remains as to what contributed to these early experiences of anxiety.
Not surprisingly, Lesser and Steininger (1975)
found low, positive and significant correlations between
college students Dg scores and the Dg scores of their
parents.

These correlations ranged from .20 to .40 with

the highest correlations being between husbands and wives.
The authors suggest that while the data supports the
hypothesis that dogmatism develops within the family,
family experiences are one source of influence, but not the
only source.
Other authors have also found a significant relationship between parental attitudes (Rebhun, 1967), child
rearing practices (Anderson, 1967), and parental level of
dogmatism (Bolmeier, 1966), with the level of their children's dogmatism.

Ehrlich (1973) suggests that parents can

create a warm, loving, supportive environment or a rejecting, neglectful, and cold, or even worse, an inconsistent
environment.

He concludes that both rejection and incon-

sistency seem directly related to such concomitants of
dogmatism as anxiety, negative self-attitudes, and the rejection of others.
While the data indicates that the familial environment is one source of influence on dogmatism levels, as
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Lesser and Steininger cautioned, it is not the only
fluence.

in~

Sticht and Fox's (1966) work indicates that

stability of the social network is another factor influencing level of dogmatism.

They found that college

students who had relatively stable social networks (changed
permanent residences three or less times during their life
time) were significantly more open-minded than college students with less stable social networks (seven to twenty
changes in permanent residences).

Additionally, it was

found that the more mobile group was significantly more
anxious than their more stationary counterparts.
Related to the stability of the social network,
Frumkin (1961) found an inverse relationship between Dg
scores and social class as measured by the HollingsheadRedlich Index.

In addition to this, Alter and White (1966)

found regional differences in Dg scores.

What this data

suggests is that in addition to familial factors, social
factors such as social class, regional norms, and the
stability of the social network all play a role in the
development of cognitive structure.
Overall, the data on antecedents of cognitive
structure closely parallel the literature on the antecedents of I-E, with people

having external orientations

and closed belief systems, as well as, those with internal
orientations and open belief systems coming from apparently
similar backgrounds.
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Dogmatism:
Resistance

Learning and

Another area in which differences in cognitive
structure has been noted to have an effect is in the area
of change and the resistance to change.

While Rokeach

(1960) suggested that dogmatic persons are highly resistant
to change, Ehrlich and Lee's (1969) review of the literature indicates that this is not always the case.
In one of the first studies to test the influence
of cognitive structure on learning, Ehrlich (196la) found
with a sample of students enrolled in an introductory
sociology course, a significant negative correlation between dogmatism scores and test performance.

Ehrlich con-

eluded that "subjects low in dogmatism entered the sociology
classroom with a higher level of learning, learned more as
a result of classroom exposure, and retained this information to a significantly greater degree than more dogmatic
subjects"

(p. 149).

While these results were duplicated in a follow-up
study, five years later (Ehrlich, 196lb), Costin (1965), in
a replication of Ehrlich's design, failed to find a significant correlation between dogmatism and classroom performance with a group of psychology students.

Costin suggested

that these results might indicate that there was more than
one kind of closed-mindedness and/or that the content of
learning was the significant intervening variable.
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Other studies have contributed to these contradictory results.

While Franklin (1961) and Zagona and Zurcher

(1965) both found that more open-minded subjects had

hi~her

grades than their more closed-minded counterparts, Christensen (1963) reported no significant correlations between
dogmatism and two postcourse measures of academic performance.

Furthermore, Baker (1964) found that, in a con-

cept-learning task, closed-minded subjects performed significantly better than the more open-minded subjects of the
study.
From 1963 to 1965, Dg scores were gathered on 2,099
students in 14 introductory psychology classes of seven
different instructors (White & Alter, 1967).

Six of the 14

correlations between dogmatism and examination grades were
significant at the .05 level with an average correlation of
-.18.
In a second and far more complex correlational
study, Rokeach and Norrell (1966) examined the relationship
between dogmatism and classroom performance for 798 subjects in 33 courses with six groups of curricular majors,
four of which were subdivided into male and female majors.
The authors found that 17 of the 33 courses provided at
least one significant correlation between course grade and
Dg scores with or without control for sex and major.

The

total analysis performed by sex and major for each course
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yielded 20 low but significant negative correlations between grades and level of dogmatism.
Ehrlich and Lee {1969) after reviewing these
studies stated that, "the number of positive results are
beyond chance, and the on-again-off-again character of the
findings strongly indicates the presence of uncontrolled,
intervening variables" {p. 251).

They suggest that the

presence or absence of five intervening variables may account for some of these shifting results.
First, numerous studies {see Jacoby, 1967; Mikol,
1960; Pyron, 1966a; Pyron, 1966b; Pyron & Lambert, 1967;
Rokeach, Oram, Laffey, & Denny, 1960; Rokeach, Swanson, &
Denny, 1960; Rokeach & Vidulich, 1960; Vacchiano, Shiffman,

& Strauss, 1967; Zagona & Kelly, 1966; Zagona & Zurcher,
1965) have indicated that open and closed groups respond
differently in novel situations.

Specifically, dogmatic

groups tend to reject the novel, the unconventional, and
the new while taking a rather conservative stance by going
along with tradition.

More open groups, on the other hand,

are more accepting of the new and adapt better to novel
situations.
A second intervening variable which has been found
to differentiate between high and low dogmatic groups is
the authority source of the new belief {see DiRenzo, 1967;
Kemp, 1962; McCarty & Johnson, 1962; Norris, 1965; Powell,
1962; Vidulich & Kaiman, 1961).

This research indicates
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that dogmatic subjects are more influenced by the status of
an authority and will change in accordance with the demands
of an authority.

While less dogmatic subjects' learning

tends to be more directed by the requirements of the situation rather than authority demands.
Thirdly, belief congruence, the principle that the
more similar a belief is with one's own belief the greater
the degree of acceptance has also differentiated between
open and closed groups.

Several studies (see Adams &

Vidulich, 1962; Costin, 1968; Kleck & Wheaton, 1967; Miller,
1965; Pyron & Kafer, 1967) have indicated that closed groups
do not learn belief-incongruent materials as well as open
groups.

In addition to this, under conditions of high cen-

trality, the fourth mediating factor, beliefs are not only
more resistant to change (Rokeach, Reyher, & Wiseman, 1968)
but also closed groups are likely to change their problemsolving behavior (White, Alter, & Rardin, 1965).
The final intervening variable suggested by Ehrlich
and Lee, Syndrome relevance, refers to the interaction between the method of presentation of information and the individual's cognitive structure.

The data indicate that

open groups are likely to be more responsive to an openended presentation of information, while closed groups are
apparently more responsive to a more dogmatic approach
(McGuckin, 1967; Rokeach, Oram, Laffey, & Denny, 1960;
Zagona & Zurcher, 1964).
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In line with the role of these intervening variables, Erhlich (1971) reanalyzed Rokeach and Norrell's
(1966) data, arguing that control for the centrality of the
materials being learned had not been taken.

Positing that

college major was an indicator of centrality, Ehrlich
found that in nonmajor areas, significant negative correlations between dogmatism and grades occurred 10 percent
of the time.

While in major area classes, there were sig-

nificant negative correlations 35 percent of the time.
It therefore seems generally correct to conclude
that, "closed-minded persons are less able than open-minded
persons to learn new beliefs and to change old beliefs.
Nevertheless, the principle remains to be qualified by a
consideration of five intervening variables:

the authority-

source of the new beliefs, the syndrome relevance of their
mode of communication, the belief congruence and novelty of
the new beliefs, and their centrality to the individual"
(Ehrlich & Lee, 1969, p. 258).
Dogmatism and Adjustment

Unlike the I-E literature which indicates that in
some situations both an internal and external orientation
may be maladaptive, the data on dogmatism indicates fairly
consistently that a closed belief system is a sign of poor
adjustment.
In two early factor-analytic studies Rokeach
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(Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956; Fruchter, Rokeach, & Novak,
1958) found that dogmatism and anxiety emerged together as
part of a single factor.

Additionally, this factor was

also loaded on self-rejection and paranoid tendencies.
This relationship between anxiety and dogmatism has been
found fairly often in most of the pertinent literature
(Norman, 1966; Rebhun, 1966; Sticht & Fox, 1966).

Given

the consistency of this finding, it seems safe to conclude
that dogmatism may be considered as a defense against
anxiety (Rokeach, 1960) .
In addition to this relationship, other studies
have contributed elements to the profile differences between open and closed groups.

Plant, Telford, and Thomas

(1965) found significant differences between open and
closed groups of college freshmen on 5 scales of the
California Psychological Inventory (CPI).

Based on these

differences the authors concluded that "the nondogmatic
subjects would be described as being outgoing and enterprising, clam and patient, mature and forceful, efficient
and clear thinking, planful and responsible, and more
likely to succeed in an academic setting than would the
highly dogmatic subjects .

.

. the dogmatic college fresh-

men would be described as being impulsive, defensive, and
conventional and stereotyped in thinking"

(pp. 73-74) .

Similarly, Vacchiano, Strauss, and Schiffman (1968)
discussed a "relatively consistent dogmatic personality
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pattern 11 which emerged from correlations between the Dg
scale and various personality measures.

They concluded

that the dogmatic subject
• • • ha[s] a need to receive support, encouragement,
and understanding from others; an intolerance for
understanding the feelings and motives of others; and
an avoidance in changing • • • environment or daily
routine . • • . lacks self-esteem, is doubtful about
. • . self-worth, is anxious, lacks confidence in himself, lacks either self-acceptance or self-satisfaction, is non-committal and defensive, and is dissatisfied with his behavior, his physical state, his own
personal worth, and his adequacy. Personality maladjustment and instability appear to underlie dogmatism
(p. 84).
Research with different populations has also shown
high levels of dogmatism to be a handicap.

Ehrlich and

Bauer (1966) found that among psychiatric patients length
of hospital stay was related to level of dogmatism.
Specifically, while 51 percent of low dogmatic patients
were discharged in less than three weeks, only 27 percent
of high dogmatic patients were discharged in this time.
Furthermore, twice as many closed-minded patients remain
hospitalized for over seven weeks as open-minded patients.
The authors stated that "the high-dogmatic patient is more
likely than the low-dogmatic patient to be diagnosed as
functionally psychotic, as having a definite thinking disorder, and as having greater social and occupational impairment.

Prognosis is poorer for the high-scoring

patients, and they are more frequently given drug therapy
and more drugs.

Finally, they are retained in the
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hospital longer than low-scoring patients"

{p. 258).

Of related interest, Butts and Chotlos {1974) found
that both a group of hospitalized patients in two different
alcoholism treatment programs as well as a group diagnosed
as schizophrenic were significantly more dogmatic than a
normal control group.
In a different context, Hallenbech and Lundstedt
{1966) found a significant difference in adjustment to
gradual blindness between open and closed groups.

Sig-

nificant correlations were found between dogmatism, denial,
and depression.

The authors suggested that the closed-

minded person is less willing to accept major changes of
the self than the more open-minded person.
While many of these studies indicate a positive
correlation between dogmatism and negative self-attitudes,
several other studies have indicated that positive selfattitudes may be independent of dogmatism level {see
Hamilton, 1971; Ohnmacht & Muro, 1967; Pannes, 1963).

In

fact, Lee and Ehrlich {1971) in a correlational study, with
a shortened version of the Dg scale without self-belief
items, found significant correlations which confirmed
theoretical expectations.

However, the authors speculated,

that because these correlations were not sizeable, that
there might be two types of dogmatism, one characterized by
negative self-attitudes, the other by positive ones.
Overall, the bulk of the data on the open and closed
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mind indicates that in most contexts, dogmatism is related
to poor adjustment and that people are apparently handicapped by a closed belief system.
Self-Esteem: Orientation
Towards the Self-as-Object
The third component of belief systems, self-esteem,
is an integral part of the self-concept.

Rosenberg (1979)

defines the self-concept as "the totality of the individual's thoughts and feelings having reference to himself
as an object"

(p. 7).

Given this definition, the self-

concept may be considered as a subsystem of the total belief system.
In delineating this component of belief systems,
Rosenberg distinguished three broad regions under the
rubric "self-concept":

the Extant Self (how people see

themselves); the Desired Self (how they would like to see
themselves); and the Presenting Self (how they show themselves to others).

In addition to these three major as-

pects of the "self-concept," Rosenberg suggests that i t has
two primary motives:

Self-Esteem (a positive or negative

orientation toward the self-as-object) and Self-Consistency
(a desire to act in accordance with the self-concept).
Finally, he states that there are four principles
that govern self-concept formation:

Reflected Appraisals

(people are influenced by the attitudes of others towards
the self and come to view themselves as they are viewed by
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others); Social Comparisons (people learn about themselves
through comparisons with others which leads to posi·;:ive,
neutral, or negative self-ratings); Self-Attribution (people
draw conclusions about themselves based in part by observing
their behavior and its outcomes); and Psychological Centrality (people differ in the relative value that they attribute to different aspects of the self-concept with more
central aspects being more resistant to change) .

This last

principle closely resembles Rokeach's discussion of the
central peripheral dimension.
Given the complexity of the self-concept, this
study will only focus on the role of self-esteem but from
within the framework provided by Rosenberg.

He states that

"self-esteem signifies a positive or negative orientation
toward an object.

When we characterize a person as having

high self-esteem, we are not referring to feelings of
superiority, in the sense of arrogance, conceit, contempt
for others, overweening pride; we mean rather, that he has
self-respect, considers himself a person of worth • • . .
The term 'low self-esteem'

• • • means that the individual

lacks respect for himself, considers himself unworthy, inadequate, or otherwise seriously deficient as a person"
(p.

54).

Antecedents of S-E
Despite the importance of the principle of
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reflected appraisals and the role of significant others in
the development of the self-concept, Rosenberg (1979)
argues that "not all significant others are equally significant and those who are more significant have greater
influence on • • • self-concepts"

(p. 83).

Specifically,

he found a significant relationship between the individual's
S-E and the opinion of valued as well as respected others-that is, those people who the individual stated were important to him or her as well as those whose opinions were
thought to be correct.

Not surprisingly, in rank-order of

importance, those significant others were found to be the
child's mother, followed by the father, sisters and
brothers, teachers, friends, and finally classmates.
However, Rosenberg points out that "the child who
has come to the conclusion that one of his significant
others . • . thinks poorly of him is much more likely to
decide that he 'doesn't care' what they think; and if, indeed, he is successful in internalizing this valuation,
then he can very effectively protect his self-esteem"
(pp. 87-89).

In other words, while the opinions of others

have an impact, the individual is not a passive recipient
of that information and he or she may actively select that
information which either enhances or protects S-E.
Rosenberg (1979) concludes that "the more the other person
criticizes or disapproves of him, the more will the individual try to shrug it off, discount their judgment, with-
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draw affect from them.

Although he will not be entirely

successful, the inclination is there.

In the long run,

then, he is likely to end up caring most about the opinions
of those who, in his view, think well of him"

(p. 90).

Given that significant others can have a significant
effect on the individual's S-E, Coopersmith's (1967) study
on the antecedents of S-E indicates the important role of
child-rearing practices in the development of S-E.

He

found that the mothers of children with high S-E tended to
have high S-E themselves, while, the mothers of children
with low S-E were not only themselves low in S-E but were
also apt to be considered emotionally unstable.

He found
4k

that the fathers of high S-E children took a more active
and supportive role in rearing their children than the
fathers of low S-E children.
His data further indicated that the most notable
antecedents of high S-E were directly related to parental
behavior and the consequences of the rules and regulation
that parents establish for their children.

Specifically,

he found that high S-E in children was related to definite
and consistently enforced limits on behavior as well as
less drastic forms of punishment, attitudes of total or
near total acceptance of children and considerable flexibility for individual behavior within established limits.
When Rosenberg's and Coopersmith's conclusions on
S-E development are combined, it can be seen how the
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selectivity of the individual child within a supportive
context provided by a high S-E family can lead to a high
level of S-E.

Furthermore, the high S-E familial environ-

ment closely parallels the more internal I-E familial
environment.
Another factor that is related to S-E is social
class.

Rosenberg's data indicates that social class has no

significant impact on the level of S-E of children, has
some modest association for adolescents, and a very significant effect on the S-E level of adults.

Specifically,

Rosenberg found that S-E was positively related to education, occupation, and income.

Luck and Heiss (1972) in

a study with adult males also found that S-E was positively
related to occupational achievement, income, and prestige
level of occupation.
Rosenberg's data indicates that to a large entent
the child's interpersonal environment is socioeconomically
homogeneous, while the adult's interpersonal environment is
relatively more heterogeneous.

Given this difference,

social comparisons based on social class will have little
impact on the S-E of children, but for adults, a significant
portion of their social comparisons is related to their
social class which does have an impact on their S-E.
In regards to the principle of reflected appraisals,
the social status of a child within the context of his or
her significant others in not important.

Howeverr with
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adults, people do interact according to the individual's
social status and it therefore has an influence on adult
S-E.

Additionally, to some extent social class is some-

thing achieved by the adult while it is something ascribed
to the child.

Therefore, due to the role of self-attribu-

tion, social status which is earned by adults will influence their level of S-E, while the social status which
is conferred on the child will not.

Parenthetically,

academic success which is earned by the child and S-E are
related for the child (see Purkey, 1970).
Finally, Rosenberg suggests that social class has
greater impact on adult S-E than on children's S-E because
social status is psychologically more central for adults
than children.

He concludes that "the general principles

governing self-esteem formation among children and adults
are . • • identical.

But one cannot understand the sig-

nificance of a social structural variable for the individual
without learning how this variable enters his experience
and is processed within his own phenomenal field.

.

. • The

differential association of social class to self-esteem for
children and adults sterns from the different social experiences and psychological interpretations associated with this
structural fact in these age groups"

(pp. 146-47).

Another area that is related to S-E is minority
group status.

While one might assume tiic:Etrntnori ty group

status might be associated with lower levels of S-E, the
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data does not support that assumption.

In regards to Black

youth, the data consistently indicates equal to higher
levels of S-E to that of comparable White samples.
McDonald and Gynther (1965) found that a group of black
high school seniors had a significantly higher level of S-E
than their white peers.

While Coleman and his associates

(1966) in a national study indicated no difference in the
"academic self-concept" of blacks and whites, McDill,
Meyers, and Rigsby (1966) found that when blacks and whites
were matched on a number of variables, blacks showed higher
academic self-concepts.

Furthermore, several large sample

studies (Bachman, 1970; Hunt & Hardt, 1969) have found that
when class, I.Q., and family structure are controlled,
blacks have higher levels of S-E than whites.
Comparable results have been reported with adult
samples.

In one study (Middleton, 1972), while black S-E

was found to be lower than white S-E, when socioeconomic
factors were controlled, blacks had significantly higher
S-E than whites.

Kohn (1969), in a nationwide study, found

blacks to be non-significantly more self-deprecatory but
significantly more self-confident than whites.
The data is not as clear with Latin-Americans as it
is with blacks.

While numerous studies (Coleman, et al.,

1966; Hishiki, 1969; Peterson & Ramirez, 1971; Zirkel &
Moses, 1971) indicate that Spanish-Americans have lower S-E
than Anglo-Americans, other studies (Carter, 1968; Healey &
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DeBlassie, 1974) have indicated that the S-E of Latinos is
equal to or higher than the S-E of Anglos.

Given these

equivocal results, it is difficult to conclude what effects
does minority group status have on the S-E of SpanishAmericans.
One minority group, in which the data is far less
equivocal, are Jews.

Of the small number of studies that

have dealt with the level of S-E of Jewish subjects, most
have indicated that Jews had somewhat higher S-E than nonJewish whites (see Anisfield, Bogo, & Lambert, 1962;
Bachman, 1970) .
Rosenberg (1979) suggests that several factors may
account for minority groups having satisfactory S-E levels.
Specifically, he points out that "the conversion of
society's attitude toward one's group • • • into the individual's attitude toward the self is logically compelling
only if certain assumptions are sound • • • • First • • •
the individual knows how the broader society feels about
his group . • . . Second . • • he accepts the societal view
of his group.

• .

• Third .

.

• he believes the societal

view of the group's characteristics apply to the self . •
Fourth • • • he is critically concerned with the majority
attitudes"

(p. 157).

In additlon to these, he suggests

that minority group members would have to make direct comparisons between themselves and the majority.
Rosenberg's data indicates that the first four
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assumptions are generally not met and that, at least among
children, the majority of minority group members

dono~com

pare themselves with whites but with members of their own
group.

However, while membership in a minority group, per

se, does not appear to be related to lower levels of S-E,
the direct experience of being different from those around
one does.
Rosenberg has discussed the negative impact of contextual dissonance on S-E.

He states that contextual dis-

sonance occurs when "people who have been socialized in one
culture or subculture find themselves in environments in
which other groups norms prevail.

In these groups, both

the qualities of others and of the self are implicated in
defining the individual as different"

(1979, p. 113).

Examples of this would include blacks in a white environment, Catholics in a Protestant environment, the poor in a
rich environment, etc.

The experience of contextual dis-

sonance is likely to be very different for the individual
than contextual consonance (e.g., Latinos in a Latin environment, Jews in a Jewish environment, etc.).
Rosenberg's (1979) data indicates that dissonant
contexts have negative effects on people's S-E.

Namely,

he found that individuals who were in a dissonant context
due to differences in religious, racial, and/or socioeconomic backgrounds consistently had lower S-E than members of their own groups who were in consonant contexts.

39
Several other studies (see Bachman, 1970; Crain & Weissman,
1972; St. John, 1975) support Rosenberg's position on the
effects of contextual dissonance on S-E.
Several possible reasons for these results have
been suggested
First • • • the consonant context is a congenial communications environment. Within it, the individual is
protected from the prejudice of the outside world . •
Second, the consonant context represents a familiar,
comfortable environment, for it is the culture into
which the individual has been socialized • • • the
individual in the consonant environment is likely to
have a feeling of belongingness, the one in the dissonant context to feel strange, ·•out of it,' somehow
•·wrong.' • • • Third, the dissonant context may represent an infelicitous comparison reference group • • •
[it] may also represent an environment of inconsistent
reflected appraisals . • • • In such an environment
there may well be a disconcerting mismatch between the
individual's taken-for-grantedself-concept, representing his fundamental framework for dealing with his
world, and the messages about himself returned to him
by others (Rosenberg, 1979, p. 125).
To briefly summarize the data on the antecedents of
global S-E, first, significant others and child-rearing
practices play an important role in the development of S-E,
but it is important to note that the individual, within
limits, actively selects those significant others who enhance his or her S-E.

Second, while the four principles of

self-concept formation (reflected appraisals, social comparisons, self-attribution and psychological centrality)
are important both to the child's and the adult's level of
S-E, only socioeconomic factors appear related to adult S-E.
Third, contrary to the common wisdom, minority group status,
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per se, does not appear to be directly related to lower
levels of S-E.

However, to

1~e

extent that prejudice and

discriminatory practices result in lower socioeconomic
status adult S-E is likely to be affected.

Finally, the

direct experience of being different due to one's religion,
race, and/or class in some negative contexts appears to be
related to lower levels of S-E.
S-E Differences
Given the many factors which contribute to the development of S-E, the question arises as to what are some
of the likely consequences of high vs. low S-E.

High and

low S-E groups have been found to consistently differ in
their reports of anxiety and depression.

As might be ex-

pected, low S-E subjects have been found to be significantly
more depressed (e.g., Beck, 1967; Kaplan & Pokorny, 1969;
Luck & Heiss, 1972; Rosenberg, 1965} and more anxious (e.g.,
Kaplan and Pokorny, 1969; Luck & Heiss, 1972; Rosenberg,

1965} than high S-E subjects.

Conversely, high S-E subjects

have been found to be significantly happier (Bachman, 1970}
and "better adjusted" (Coopersmith, 1967; Rosenberg, 1965}
than their low S-E counterparts.
In addition to these differences, Fitts (1972}
cites evidence from numerous unpublished studies which indicate that low S-E groups drop-out of school significantly
more than higher S-E groups.

While high S-E groups have
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been found to not only perform better academically but also
have more positive social relationships as well (see Combs,
1964; Shaw, Edson, & Bell, 1960;

Sha~

& McCuen, 1960;

Williams & Cole, 1968).
Overall, this small sample of S-E differences tend
to indicate that low S-E groups appear to function poorly,
experience more "failure" and "unhappiness" and less "success" than high S-E groups.
A second question which arises is how exactly does
S-E contribute to these differences.

Another area of dif-

ference between S-E groups, that may provide some answers
to this question, deal with research on success and failure
experiences.

Numerous studies (Fitch, 1970; Leventhal &

Perloe, 1962; Silverman, 1964; Stotland & Hillman, 1962;
Stotland, Thorley, Cohen, & Zander, 1957) have found that
high S-E subjects tend to be more sensitive to success and
favorable feedback and less sensitive to failure and negative feedback than low S-E subjects.

While just the ob-

verse has been found with low S-E subjects.

Furthermore,

high S-E groups tend to evaluate their performance more
favorably even when their objective performance is equivalent to low S-E groups (Shrauger, 1972).

In addition to

these differences, Shrauger and Patterson (1974) found that
high S-E subjects evaluated others more frequently on
dimensions on which they themselves compared favorably than
did low S-E subjects.

In other words, these groups appear
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to assimilate data which is not only congruent with their
self-image but also appears to maintain it.
Of related interest, Mischel, Ebbeson, and Zeiss
(1973) point out that after a success experience, people
tend to engage in behaviors which perpetuate the positive
affect induced by success.

However, given the differential

responsiveness of high and low S-E groups to succ3ss and
failure experiences, it can easily be seen how low S-E
groups are more prone to depression, anxiety, etc.
Belief Systems Nexus: Similarities and Differences
Overall the data has indicated definite similarities
between and among the three assessed components of belief.
Specifically, individuals with an internal orientation
appear to come from similar backgrounds as individuals with
high S-E as well as those with an open orientation.

The

same parallels also hold true for individuals with an external orientation, low S-E, and high Dg.

Furthermore, the

literature fairly consistently indicates that an internal
orientation, low Dg, and high S-E are all related to better
adjustment than an external orientation, high Dg, and low
S-E.
In addition to these parallels, numerous studies
(see Chandler, 1976; Clouser & Hjelle, 1970; Fish &
Karabenick, 1971; Ryckman & Cannon, 1975; Ryckman & Sherman,
1973; Sherman, Pelletier, & Ryckman, 1973) have indicated

43
significant correlations between and among these three
variables.

Given these significant associations as we:'.. l as

the noted consequences of differences in these three belief
continua, two clusters of belief components appear to
emerge:

one characterized by a sense of internal or per-

sonal control of events, openness to experience, and a
sense of positive self-worth; the other characterized by a
sense of external control or lack of personal control,
guardedness, and a sense of worthlessness.
While the data indicates significant associations
between and among these variables, it is also important to
point out some of the differences between and among them.
Rosenberg (1979) suggests that while I-E and S-E may be
related they are not identical.

He states that:

a major reason is that sore people do not stake themselves
on competence and mastery. To them being lovable,
moral, self-sacrificing and helpful are major concerns;
they may be quite contented to leave the mastery of
life's harsh problems and challenges to others. On the
other hand, there are those abundantly endowed with
ability and talent who are confident of their ability
to succeed in most tasks but who lack self-respect because they cannot be first in everything, cannot command the love of another, or are overwhelmed by a
denigrated social identity element (pp. 31-32).
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) provide some empirical
support for Rosenberg's distinction.

The authors found

that while girls and women have an equivalent level of S-E
to that of boys and men, women score more externally than
men.

The authors suggest the role of sex-role socializa-

tion and sexist discrimination as factors contributing to

44
these I-E differences between the sexes.

Similarly, while

the I-E literature indicated that various socially disadvantaged groups have a more external orientation than
others, the S-E literature indicated that minority group
members tended to have the same level of S-E as majority
group members.
In a similar vein, Lee and Ehrlich (1971) have
speculated that Dg and S-E may not be inversely related.
Ehrlich (1978) reports that he and Lee have isolated individuals with high Dg levels and strong positive selfattitudes, as well as those with high Dg levels and strong
negative self-attitudes.

He suggests that:

the critical issue may be beliefs about verification.
For some persons, there may be a relative emphasis
placed on authority as compared with a personal test
for validating information received. Thus, closedminded persons whose verification beliefs require
reference to authority may have negative self-attitudes.
Closed-minded persons whose verification beliefs require some mode of personal test may have positive
self-attitudes (p. 159).
In sum, while it is important to be aware of the
similarities between and among the three assessed components of belief, the differences are equally important.
Moreover, it is important to stress a semantic as well as
empirical point.

The two above-mentioned belief system

clusters do not represent a static typology but rather
points of convergence in a changeable matrix of belief.
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Belief System Change
Several studies have important implications for belief system change.

In one study, Lefcourt (1967) found

that externally oriented subjects exhibited a marked shift
to a more internal orientation when they were informed that
achievement reinforcement was available.

Lefcourt sug-

gested that the lack of goal striving of externally
oriented subjects was due to their being less perceptive
than more internally oriented subjects.

He further stated

that by learning what cues where linked with reinforcement
pessibilities, an individual could learn to generalize
reward-gaining behavior to new situations.
These hypotheses are supported to a degree by Smith
(1970) who found that clients who went through a crisis
intervention program in which they had to learn to solve
their own problems became more internally oriented than a
comparable group going through traditional psychotherapy.
A second therapy study provides even more direct
support for Lefcourt's arguments.

Dua (1970) contrasted

the effects on I-E of an action-oriented approach directed
at improving interpersonal skills with a re-education
therapy approach.

The action-oriented treatment involved

planning specific behaviors for improving relationships,
while the re-educative approach was directed toward influencing the clients' attitudes.

Dua found that in com-

parison to an untreated control group both the action-
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oriented approach and the re-education approach lead to a
decrease in external orientation.

However, it was the more

action-oriented skills training approach which produced the
most significant change.
Two studies that deal with different populations
indicate that learning skills which result in increased
effectiveness as helpers lead to a more internal orientation.

Gottesfeld and Dozier (1966) found that people from

East Harlem, an urban ghetto, who were trained and then
worked as community organizers became increasingly more
internally directed.

Similarly, Martin and Shepel (1974)

found that nurses who received training in personal
counseling skills made a significant shift towards internality.
In addition to these studies, several other researchers have found that college students who have participated in various encounter study group experiences also
evidenced a significant movement towards an internal orientation (Diamond & Shapiro, 1973; Foulds, 1971; Foulds,
Guinan & Warehime, 1974a), increased S-E (Martin & Fischer,
1974) and decreased Dg (Foulds, Guinan, & Warehime, 1974b).
These studies have several factors in common which
may have contributed to significant change in belief.
First, because of the action-oriented nature of these approaches, the individual was encouraged to take a direct
and active role in his or her own training or treatment.
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This active role is likely to lead to greater self-attribution which is likely to facilitate bahavior and belief systern change (Davidson & Valins, 1968, 1969).

Secondly, and

in line with Lefcourt's suggestions, the explicit nature of
most of these approaches help to make social cues more explicit and as a result enable the individual to '!see" the
path to social reinforcement.

Finally, learning more

effective behaviors is not only likely to influence the
individual's environment but also their belief system.
Interpersonal Skills Training
Human beings are, among other things, social
animals and a great deal of their reinforcement come from
their interactions with others.

The individual generally

has a strong desire for positive interpersonal relationships.

However, despite this strong desire, people do not

always get what they want.

Several theories have discussed

the likely consequences of frustration of important need
areas.

Specifically, social learning theory makes the

following prediction:
When an individual places a high value on a particular
need area and at the same time has low expectancies
that more desirable behavior will lead to satisfactions
in that area, he will typically engage in avoidant behaviors . . . failure to be rewarded in a strong need
area is perceived as punishing. Thus, whether we are
talking about a simple expectation for punishment or
the failure to receive rewards that one values highly,
the outcome is the same--a very unpleasant affective
state which the individual will attempt to avoid
(Phares , 19 7 2 , p . 4 41 ) .
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Of related interest, Beck (1967) states that there
are three components to depression:
ences in a negative way,

(1) construing experi-

(2) viewing the self in a negative

way, and (3) having negative expectations of the future.
Given this triadic configuration, Beck points out that one
way of changing the motivational pattern of the individual
is by changing his/her cognition.

He states that:

As long as he expec:ts a negative outcome from any
course of action, he is stripped of any internal
stimulation to do anything. Conversely, when he is
persuaded that a positive outcome may result from a
particular endeavor, he may then experience an internal
stimulus to pursue it (p. 236).
While many theorists think that interpersonal relationships are one of the most basic and crucial areas of
human functioning (Sullivan, 1953; Horney, 1937; Fromm,
1955; and many others), it seems likely that for individuals
with an external orientation, a low sense of S-E and/or a
high level of Dg, interpersonal relationships are likely to
be problematic.

Therefore, given the possible universal

desire for positive interpersonal relationships and the
negative consequences of having a low expectation of sue-cess in this area, the literature on the effects of what is
called interpersonal skills training is quite pertinent.
Carkhuff (1969b) has researched and developed a
systematic training approach which appears to be not only
effective but also economical.

He states that:

We can do anything in training that we can do in treatment--and more. Training in interpersonal skills

49
strikes at the heart of most difficulties in living.
Systematic training in interpersonal skills affords a
means of implementing the necessary learning in progressive gradations of experience which insure the success
of the learning. In making explicit use of all sources
of learning--the experiential, the didactic, and modeling--systematic group training in interpersonal skills
provides the most effective, economical, and efficient
means of achieving the individual growth of the largest
number of persons (1969b, pp. 130-31).
Carkhuff's thesis of directly training clients in
interpersonal skills appears to be in line with the Dua
(1970) and Smith (1970) studies mentioned above; that is,
an action-oriented treatment approach which may facilitate
self-attributed behavior change and leads to increased internality and a heightened sense of S-E.

Furthermore, with

its emphasis on empathy, skills training is likely to increase the individual's understanding of others which
Marris (1974) believes is an adaptive alternative to dogmatism.
Several researchers have found positive effects of
skills training with parents (Carkhuff & Bierman, 1970;
Carkhuff & Griffin, 1971) , prison inmates (Devine &
Steinberg, 1974; Montgomery, 1974), delinquents (Carkhuff,
Berenson, Griffin, Devine, Angelone, Clinton, Keeling,
Muth, Patch & Steinberg, 1974) and ex-felons (Griffin,
1973)

0

In one study, Pierce and Drasgow (1969) made comparisons of different modes of treatment with neuropsychiatric in-patients.

They found that subjects in a training
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group showed significantly more improvement than drugthernpy, group-therapy, or individual-therapy subjects.
After interviewing the patients, they discovered that the
patients of the ward found those patients who received
training to be significantly more helpful than those
patients who had not received training.

The authors recom-

mended that:
If one wants to create a truly therapeutic atmosphere
in either group therapy or on the wards, one must train
the patients, since they do not exist in isolation from
each other but rather are a major part of each other's
environment (p. 298).
In another study (Vitale, 1971), patients' improvement in interpersonal functioning was found to be significantly greater than that which resulted through modeling in group therapy.

The training was also found to have

affected a general improvement in patients' social functioning.

Based on this evidence, Vitale stated that:

This consistent efficacy in producing improved social
functioning suggests the present program as a preferred
mode of treatment in instances where the presenting
problem is predominantly interpersonal. Further, the
briefness of the training combined with the importance
of the skills it transmits suggest it as adjunct treatment to all forms of therapeutic intervention (p. 170).
The research data seems to indicate that interpersonal skills training is effective as an adjunct to
traditional modes of treatment if not a preferred mode of
treatment itself.
Finally, with a normal population, Egan (1976) has
developed a human relations training model similar to

51
Carkhuff's and directly related to the possibility of
effecting significant belief system changes.

In fact, it

is Egan's thesis that:
Increasing your interpersonal skills can make you less
vulnerable to random social influence for a number of
reasons. Skills training gives you a greater sense of
competence and increases your self-esteem. You become
less dependent and freed at least to a degree, from the
need for social approval. You also acquire the ability
to challenge untoward attempts at influence in your
regard. On the other hand, learning communication
skills can open you up to more reasonable kinds of
social influence. You can listen more carefully to
what others have to say and with greater understanding.
You are less defensive and therefore more willing to
listen (p. 243).
The research on skills training and the studies on
changes in belief appear to have a point of convergence.
It seems that what is needed to help change an external
orientation to an internal one, is to show the individual
that reinforcement is not up to luck but is contingent, in
part, upon what he or she does.

Systematically training

individuals in those skills which they need to deal effectively with their environment seems to be a direct way to
change not only control orientation but also the
ual's sense of self-worth.

individ~

Furthermore, with increased

effectiveness, the need to take a defensive dogmatic stance
is likely to be diminished.
Purpose of the Study
The present study attempts to probe the relationship between behavior change and belief system.

Specifi-
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cally, the relationsh:1.p between elements within the belief
system (i.e., I-E,

s-:•:.:,

and Dg) ; the role of the belief

system on level of interpersonal skills; as well as, the
effect of increased interpersonal functioning on the belief
system.
Specific Hypotheses
1.

Subjects completing a human relations training

class (experimental I condition) will show a significant
increase in interpersonal skills as measured by a behavioral rating scale based on the work of Egan (1976) and
Carkhuff (1969b).
2.

At pretest, the external experimental I sub-

jects will have a significantly lower level of interpersonal
skills than internal experimental I subjects.
3.

At pretest, the low S-E experimental I subjects

will have a significantly lower level of interpersonal
skills than high S-E experimental I subjects.
4.

At pretest, the high Dg experimental I subjects

will have a significantly lower level of interpersonal
skills than low Dg experimental I subjects.
5.

At posttest, the internal experimental I sub-

jects will show a greater increase (over pretest level) in
interpersonal skills than the external experimental I subjects.
6.

At posttest, the high S-E experimental I
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subjects will show a greater increase (over pretest level)
in interpersonal skills than the low S-E experimental I
subjects.
7.

At posttest, the low Dg experimental I subjects

will show a greater increase (over pretest level) in interpersonal skills than high Dg experimental I subjects.
8.

Internal subjects will have significantly lower

Dg scale scores than external subjects.
9.

Internal subjects will have significantly

higher S-E scale scores than external subjects.
10.

At posttest, the experimental I subjects and

subjects completing a counseling skills training course
(experimental II condition) will score significantly
lower on the Dg scale than control I and II subjects.
11.

At posttest, the experimental I and II subjects

will score significantly higher on the S-E scale than control I and II subjects.
12.

At posttest, the experimental I and II external

subjects will become significantly more internal than control I and II external subjects.

CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 140 students who enrolled into one of
three psychology courses:

Psychology 378--Laboratory in

Interpersonal Relations; two sections of Psychology 376-Counseling I; and Psychology 395--Field Study in Psychology.

There were 54 male subjects ranging in age from

20 to 46 years with 13 to 21 years of formal education.
There were 86 female subjects ranging in age from 19 to 48
years with 13 to 20 years of formal education.

(For a

further description of the subjects see Table 1.)
The students were classified into one of four conditions depending upon which course they took.

Those sub-

jects enrolling in the human relations training course
(Psychology 378) and the experiential training section of
the counseling course (Psychology 376) were designated as
Experimental groups I and II, respectively.

While those

who enrolled in the didactic section of the counseling
course and the field study course (Psychology 376 and 395)
were designated as the Control groups I and II.
The subjects were further classified along the I-E
54
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Table 1
Mean and Standard Deviations for Age and Years of
Formal Education

Group
Experimental I
Age

Males
N
X

SD
Education

X

SD
Experimental I I
Age

N
X

SD
Education

X

SD
Control I
Age

N
X

SD
Education

X

SD
Control I I
Age

N

X

SD
Education

X

SD

15

Females
30

All
Subjects
45

25.27
4.23

27.6 0
6.63

26.60
6.05

15.73
2.25

15.70
2.05

15.71
2.10

15

21

36

25.00
7.13

24.90
7.93

24.94
7.50

15.67
2.13

14.81
1.50

15.17
1.81

14

21

35

20.71
2.40

23.19
5.46

22.20
4.61

13.93
1.14

14.48
1.21

14.26
1.20

10

14

24

20.70
0.95

21.86
3.08

21.38
2.46

14.60
0.52

14.64
0.84

14.63
0.71
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continuum into three I-E groups.

Those subjects scoring

in the lowest third on the Rotter (1966) scale were classified as Internals (0 to 7 on the Rotter), those scoring in
the middle third were classified as Moderates (8 to 10 on
the Rotter) and those receiving the highest scores were
classified as Externals (11 to 21 on the Rotter).

In ad-

dition to I-E classification, a median-split was used to
further classify the experimental I subjects into high
and low levels of Dg and S-E.
All subjects were thus classified into one of four
conditions (Experimental I or II or Control I or II) and
into one of three I-E groups (Internal, Moderate, or
External) with the experimental I subjects also being classified into different levels of Dg and S-E.
Instruments
The I-E scale developed by Rotter (1966) was used
to assess subjects' reinforcement orientation.

It con-

sists of 23 question pairs plus six filler questions, and
uses a forced-choice format.

Some examples are:

"Many

of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to
bad luck," vs. "People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make." and "It is hard to know whether or not
a person really likes you." vs. "How many friends you have
depends on how nice a person you are."
is shown in Appendix D.

This questionnaire

57
The second instrument used was the Dogmatism (Dg)
scale (Form E) developed by Rokeach (1960) to assess differences in the openness or closedness of belief systems.
The Dg scale consists of 40 Likert-type items.

Responses

are scored along a +3 to -3 agree-disagree scale, with the
0 point excluded.

These scores are converted to a 1 to 7

point scale by adding the constant 4 to each score.

The

range of possible scores is therefore from 40 to 280 with
high scores indicating a closed orientation.
amples are:

Some ex-

"The main thing in life is for a person to

want to do something important."

"A person who thinks

primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt."
"Most people just don't know what's good for them."

This

instrument can be found in Appendix E.
The third measure used was the Revised Janis-Field
Scale (Eagley, 1967).

This is a 20 item, five-point

Likert scale used to measure S-E.

Scores may range from

20 to 100 with high scores indicating a high level of S-E.
A copy of this scale can be found in Appendix F.
While the I-E, Dg, and S-E scales were used as pretest and posttest measures for all subjects, a five point
behavioral rating scale, was used as a pretest and posttest
instrument with the Experimental I group only.

This scale

was used to assess nine basic interpersonal skills (see
Egan, 1976 and Carkhuff, 1969b).

The mean of the scale,

3.0, refers to a minimally effective level of interpersonal
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functioning.

Scores below 3.0 are indicative of less ef-

fectiveness and greater interpersonal disorganization while
scores above 3.0 are indicative of a higher level of interpersonal effectiveness.

This scale is shown in Appendix C.

In addition to this scale, a copy of Carkhuff's scoring
norms (1969, pp. 315-329) are shown in Appendix A as well
as an example rating guide (Appendix B).
Procedures
The experimenter administered the I-E, Dg, and S-E
scales to all subjects during the first and last meeting of
their respective classes.

Subjects were told that the ex-

perimenter was gathering data on people's attitudes and beliefs.

They were instructed to answer all questions, that

there were no right or wrong answers, and to indicate
which statements they agreed with most or best described
their experience.
After the first meeting of their classes, the experimental I and II subjects were randomly assigned to
their permanent small skills training groups of 5 to 7
members with one or two trainers.

(Because of a lack of a

sufficient number of trainers experimental II subjects did
not have a regular trainer.)
The training received by the experimental I subjects
consisted of both didactic instruction in the form of lectures and experiential step-by-step practice in the nine
basic interpersonal skills discussed by Egan (1976).

The
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subjects moved from practicing simple listening skills in
dyads and triads to the development of more complex interpersonal skills {e.g., confrontation, immediacy, etc.)
within the context of an open group {see Egan, 1976).

In

addition to this, the subjects read materials on the skills
and did pertinent workbook assignments {Egan,

1975b, 1976;

Wood, 1974).
The experimental II subjects received training similar to that of the subjects under the first condition.
However, while the emphasis in training for the first
group was the development of skills useful in peer relationships, the training focus under the second condition
was the development of communication skills useful in a
helping relationship.
The training methodology in this group closely
paralleled that used in the first condition.

Experimental

II subjects received didactic instruction in the form of
lectures on therapy and counseling as well as experiential
step-by-step practice in eight basis helping skills {Egan,
1975a).

The subjects practiced these skills while role-

playing helpers and clients.
The trainers of each of the small groups made an
assessment of the subjects' interpersonal
skills, after the second and last meeting of their small
training groups.

All trainers made independent evalua-
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tions and were blind to the subjects' tests scores as well
as the hypotheses of the study.
The subjects in the third condition went through a
traditional didactic academic course which reviewed various
theories on counseling and psychotherapy.

However, sub-

jects in this condition did not receive any direct experiential training in either social or helping skills.
Subjects in the fourth condition, the field study
course, worked as volunteers in an applied setting for
various agencies in the community.

As part of their

learning experience, these students participated in a
weekly support group with their peers in which they discussed their experiences and expressed their feeling within
the context of a peer support group.
To reiterate, subjects in both experimental conditions received systematic training in either interpersonal
or helping skills as well as appropriate didactic input.
Subjects in the third condition received didactic input
on various theories of counseling and psychotherapy while
subjects in the fourth condition had a supportive group
experience without systematic skills training.
At the end of the semester, all subjects were retested with the I-E, Dg, and S-E scales.

Prior to taking

this posttest, none of the subjects knew that they would be
asked to retake the scales that they had taken earlier as
a pretest.

There was a 13 week time lapse between the

61
pretest and posttest and during this period, there was no
contact between

~he

experimenter and the subjects.

Scoring
Both pretest and posttest interpersonal skills
scores were based on trainers' ratings of the experimental
I subjects' skills.

Each of the small group trainers rated

the skills of the members of their respective groups.

In

those groups having two trainers, the trainers were instructed to make independent assessments of members'
skills.

In order to obtain a single pretest and a single

posttest skill score for all experimental I subjects, the
ratings of those groups having two trainers were averaged
and the mean score designated as their skill score.

Since

the trainers were familiar with the Carkhuff and Egan assessment procedures, no special training was given to them
for this study.

They were simply asked to rate subjects'

skills according to the method shown in Appendix

c.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Analysis of I-E Data
In order to determine if a significant change in
I-E occurred as a result of the training received by the
experimental groups, the I-E change scores were subjected
to an analysis of variance unweighted means solution (Winer,
1971).

The pretest and posttest means and change scores

for these data are presented in Table 2.

Results of the

analysis of variance for the I-E data are shown in Table
3.

The factor A main effect is non-significant (F [2,128]

=1.44, p. = .25) indicating that the Internal, Moderate,
and External subjects do not significantly differ with respect to changes in their level of I-E.

The factor B main

effect is non-significant (F [3,128]=1.66, p. = .25).

This

shows that the groups under the different conditions (Experimental I and II or Control I and II) do not significantly differ with respect to their changes in level of
I-E.

Furthermore, the AB interaction is also non-signif-

icant (F [6,128]=1.27, p. = N.S.) and this indicates that
there was no interaction between level of I-E and condition.
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Table 2
Mean I-E Pretest, Post test and Change Scores
for I-E and Condition
N

Pretest

Post test

Change

Experimental I
(N=45)

Internal
Moderate
External

19
10
16

5.37
8.70
12.81

5.89
6.20
9.63

+0.53
-2.50
-3.19

Experimental II
(N=36)

Internal
Moderate
External

13
12
11

4.92
9.08
14.18

5.23
10.58
12.73

+0.31
+1.50
-1.45

Control I
(N=35)

Internal
Moderate
External

14
11
10

5.29
9.45
13.70

4.86
8.36
13.00

-0.43
-1.09
-0.70

Control II
(N=24)

Internal
Moderate
External

3
8
13

5.33
9.00
13.92

4.67
9.63
13.85

-0.67
+0.63
-0.08
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Table 3

Analysis of Variance of I-E

Change Scores as a

Function of Skills Training
(Unweighted Means Solution)

Source of Variation

ss

df

NS

F

p

I-E (A)

34.54

2

17.27

1.44

.25

Condition (B)

59.98

3

19.99

1.66

.25

AB

91.67

6

15.28

1.27

1,538.09 128

12.02

Within Subjects
(N=l40)
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The data thus fails to support the twelfth hypotheses of this study.

Specifically, the I-E groups did not

differ in their changes of I-E and the type of learning
experience which the subjects had did not cause significantly different changes in I-E.
Analysis of Dg and S-E Data
In order to determine the effects of skills training on Dg and S-E, as well as the relationship between
I-E and Dg and S-E, the pretest and posttest Dg and S-E
scores were each subjected to a repeated measures analysis
of variance unweighted means solution (Winer, 1971}.

The

pretest and posttest means and change scores for the Dg
data are presented in Table 4.

The results of the analy-

.sis on Dg scores are shown in Table 5.

The factor A main

effect is very highly significant (F [2,128]=6.10, p. =
.005) which indicates that the I-E groups differ very significantly in their levels of Dg.

The factor B main ef-

fect is non-significant (F [3,128=2.09, p. = .11) which
indicates that the subjects under the four conditions of
this study did not differ in their Dg level.

None of the

other F ratios were significant which means that there
were no significant changes in the Dg level of any of the
subjects under any of the four conditions in the study.
However because the factor A main effect was significant, a Neuman-Keuls post-hoc analysis was performed
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Table 4
Mean Dogmatism Pretest Posttest and Change
Scores for I-E and Condition
N

Pretest

Post test

Change

Experimental I
(N=45)

Internal
Moderate
External

19
10
16

124.68
131.50
146.63

125.05
132.40
142.69

+0.37
+0.90
-3.94

Experimental II
(N=46)

Internal
Moderate
External

13
12
11

129.85
153.92
147.18

121.69
143.58
152.73

-8.16
-10.34
+5.55

Control I
(N=35)

Internal
Moderate
External

14
11
10

140.71
133.45
155.10

144.64
137.91
155.90

+3.93
+4.46
+0.80

Control II
(N=24)

Internal
Moderate
External

3
8
13

122.00
139.63
136.08

121.67
134.13
137.77

-0.33
-5.50
+1.69
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance of Dg Scores as a Function
of I-E and Skills Training
(Unweighted Means Solution)
Source of Variation

ss

df

MS

F

p

Between Subjects
I-E (A)

12,278.07

2

6,139.04

6.10

.005

Condition (B)

6,312.94

3

2,104.31

2.09

.11

AB

5,299.60

6

883.27

.88

128,765.40

128

1,005.98

44.22

1

44.22

.28

AC

126.79

2

63.40

.41

BC

393.08

3

131.03

.84

ABC

811.77

6

135.30

.87

19,909.00

128

155.54

Subj. w/groups
(error between)
Within Subjects
Pre/Post (C)

ex

subj. w/groups
(error within)
(N=l40)
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to further probe this result.

The Neuman-Keuls analysis

of significant differences in Dg levels of the three I-E
groups is summarized in Table 6.

The data supports the

eighth hypothesis that internal subjects are significantly
less dogmatic than their more external peers (p.

=

.05).

The pretest and posttest means and change scores
for the S-E data are presented in Table 7.

The results of

the analysis on S-E scores which is summarized in Table 8
closely parallel the results of analysis on Dg scores.

The

factor A main effect is very highly significant (F [2,128]
=6.43, p. = .005) indicating that the I-E groups differ
significantly in their levels of S-E.

Data from a Neuman-

Keuls post-hoc analysis, which was used to probe this
difference, is shown in Table 9.

The results of this

analysis which supports hypothesis 9 indicates that both
Internal and Moderate subjects have a significantly higher
level of S-E than External subjects (p.

=

.05).

In addition to this, the factor C main effect
approaches significance (F [1,128]=3.89, p.

=

.06) which

indicates that a near-significant pretest-posttest change
in S-E occurred.

However, because none of the other F

ratios were significant, this near-significant change in
S-E occurred independent of condition and level of I-E.
By inspection of the cell means (Table 7), it can be seen
that in most cases the level of S-E increased at posttest.

69

Table 6
Neuman-Keuls Post-hoc Analysis of
Mean Dg Scores
I-E Groups
Means
Internal

128.79

Moderate

138.32

External

146.76

*P=. 05

Internal

Moderate

External

128.79

138.32

146.76

9.53

17.97*
8.44
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Table 7
Mean S-E Pretest Posttest and Change
Scores for I-E Condition
N

Pretest

Post test

Change

Experimental I
(N=45)

Internal
Moderate
External

19
10
16

77.00
77.07
63.88

76.42
78.50
68.94

-0.58
+1.43
+5.06

Experimental II
(N=36)

Internal
Moderate
External

13
12
11

79.00
70.18
66.90

79.64
73.91
69.40

+0.64
+3.73
+2.50

Control I
(N=35)

Internal
Moderate
External

14
11
10

76.15
77.25
69.09

76.69
77.67
69.18

+0.54
+0.42
+0.09

Control II
(N=24)

Internal
Moderate
External

3
8
13

73.67
76.75
72.31

78.00
76.00
72.23

+4.33
-0.75
-0.08

71

Table 8
Analysis of Variance of S-E Scores as a Function
of I-E and Skills Training
(Unweighted Means Solution)
Source of Variation

ss

df

p

F

Between Subjects
I-E (A)

2,922.83

2

1,461.42

88.26

3

29.42

815.29

6

135.88

29,085.50

128

227.23

110.27

1

110.27

AC

7.50

2

3.75

BC

29.61

3

9.87

170.35

6

28.39

3,626.60

128

28.33

Condition (B)
AB
Subj. w/groups
(error between)

6.43

.005

3.89

.06

Within Subjects
Pre/Post (C)

ABC

c

x subj. w/groups
(error within)

1.00
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Table 9
Neuman-Keuls Post-hoc Analysis of Mean S-E Scores
I-E Groups

External
Means

External

68.99

Moderate

76.00

Internal

77.07

*p=.OS

68.99

Moderate
76.00
7.01*

Internal
77.07

8.08*
1.07
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In sum, Internal subjects were found to be significantly more open-minded than External subjects as well as
both Internal and Moderate subjects having a significantly
higher level of S-E than External subjects.

While there

was no significant pretest-posttest change in the Dg
levels of the subjects, there was a near-significant change
in the S-E levels of the subjects.

However, this occurred

independently of condition and level of I-E.
Inter-Judge Reliability
for Skills Data
Mean skills scores for the six training groups
having two rater-trainers are shown in Table 10.

When

comparison data for these groups was ordered according
to the scoring categories in Appendix B, the inter-judge
reliability based on the Spearman rho statistic (Guilford,
1956) ranged from .92 to .99 with a mean rank-order correlation of .96 for the six training groups (see Table
11).

According to Carkhuff's (1969b) research, an inter-

judge reliability of .96 would be considered as highly
reliable.

Carkhuff's raters usually obtain an inter-

judge reliability at or above .85 (Cannon and Carkhuff,
1969).

In addition to this, Table 11 indicates that all

of the six rank-order correlations were significant at
either the .01 or .OS level.

Taken as a whole, the data

indicates excellent inter-judge reliability.
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Table 10
Inter-Judge Comparison of Mean Ratings for Pretest
Post test Interpersonal Skills Ratings (N=28)
Small Group

Pretest

Post test

(N=5)

Rater 1
3.11

Rater 2
2.94

Rater 1
3.77

Rater 2
3.62

II (N=4)

Rater 3
3.24

Rater 4
3.83

Rater 3
3.73

Rater 4
4.20

III (N=4)

Rater 5
2.67

Rater 6
2.50

Rater 5
4.03

Rater 6
3.15

IV (N=5)

Rater 7
2.97

Rater 8
2.61

Rater 7
4.83

Rater 8
4.02

Rater 9
2.49

Rater 10
2.80

Rater 9
3.81

Rater 10
3.48

Rater 11
3.77

Rater 12
2.97

Rater 11
4.18

Rater 12
3.71

I

v

(N=5)

VI (N=5)
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Table 11
Small Training Groups Inter-Judge Reliability for
Pretest and Posttest Interpersonal
Skill Ratings (N=28)
Small Group

Rho

p

N

I

.92

.05

5

II

.92

.05

4

III

.97

.05

4

IV

.99

.01

5

v

.97

.01

5

VI

.98

.01

5

Range .92-.99
Mean Rho .96
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Analysis of Skills Data
In order to obtain a single pretest and a single
posttest skill score for all experimental I subjects, the
ratings of those subjects having two trainers were averaged and the mean score designated as their skill score.
The final skill score pretest and posttest means for the
various belief system configurations of experimental I
subjects are shown in Table 12.
To determine if skills training effected a significant change in interpersonal functioning as well as the
effects of the individual's belief system on that possible
change, the pretest and posttest skill scores for the experimental I subjects were subjected to a repeated measures
analysis of variance unweighted means solution (Winer,
1971).

The results of the analysis of variance for the

skills data are summarized in Table 13.

The factor A main

effect is non-significant (F [2,33]=0.21, p.=NS) as are
the factor B main effect (F [1,33]=0.13, p.=NS) and factor
C main effect (F [1,33]=0.05, p.=NS).

What this indicates

is that the subjects' level of I-E (Internal, Moderate, or
External) , S-E (High or Low) or Dg (High or Low) does not
result in significantly different levels of interpersonal
skills.

In addition to this, it can be seen that none of

the interactions among the three components of belief resulted in any significant differences in skills level.
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Table 12
Mean I-E, S-E, Dg Pretest and Posttest Skill Scores
N

Pretest

Post test

Internal

19

2.75

3.49

Moderate

10

2.78

3.89

External

16

2.81

3.71

High S-E

23

2.89

3.64

Low S-E

22

2.66

3.76

High Dg

23

2.71

3.73

Low Dg

22

2.84

3.67
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Table 13
Analysis of Variance of Skills Scores
(Unweighted Means Solution}
Source of Variation

ss

df

MS

F

p

Between Subjects
I-E (A}

.41

2

.21

.53

S-E (B)

.OS

1

.05

.13

Dg(C}

.02

1

.02

.OS

AB

.54

2

.27

.68

AC

1.34

2

.67

1.68

BC

.02

1

.02

.OS

ABC

.91

2

.46

1.15

13.19

33

.40

11.55

1

11.55

88.85

AD

.32

2

.16

1.23

BD

.41

1

.41

3.15

CD

.11

1

.11

.85

ABD

.02

2

.01

.08

ACD

.57

2

.29

2.19

.25

GCD

.25

1

.25

1.97

.25

ABCD

2.02

2

1.01

7.77

.005

D x subj. w/groups

4.41

33

.13

Subj. w/groups

.25

Within Subjects
Pre/Post (D)

.001

.09
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In other words, none of the three components of belief nor
any configuration of belief system resulted in any significant between subject differences in interpersonal skills.
Thus the data fails to support the second, third, and
fourth hypotheses of this study.
However, the within subjects data indicates that
the factor D main effect if very highly significant
(F [1,33]=88.85, p.=.OOl) indicating that regardless of
belief system configuration and in support of the first
hypothesis, the subjects had a very highly significant
increase in their interpersonal skills.

In addition to

this, there is a near-significant BD interaction (F [1,33]
=3.15, p.=.09).

A Neuman-Keuls analysis (Table 15) in-

dicated that not only were the posttest skill scores of
both the high S-E and low S-E subjects significantly
higher than their pretest scores, but also that the high
S-E subjects' pretest scores were significantly higher
than the pretest skill scores of the low S-E subjects.
However, this pretest difference between S-E groups was
not maintained at posttest.

In other words, the post-hoc

analysis of the near-significant BD interaction shows that
the S-E groups differ in their level of skills at pretest,
but that this difference is not maintained and that both
groups make significant gains in their skills.
Finally, of the remaining within subjects interactions, only the ABCD interaction was significant
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{F [2,33]=7.77, p.=.OOS).

This indicates a complex fourth

order interaction between the various level of I-E, S-E,
Dg, and time {Pre and Post).

With the exception of a very

highly significant increase in skills across all groups,
no clearly interpretable pattern could be determined from
the data.

This was due to the complexity of the inter-

action and the fact that some of the cells had only one
member {see Table 14).
Summary of Results
An analysis of variance performed on the I-E change
scores of the experimental I and II and the control I and
II subjects indicated that no significant changes in I-E
occurred regardless of I-E level or condition.
A second and third analysis of variance performed
on the pretest and posttest Dg and S-E scores, respectively,
indicated significant differences in the level of Dg and
S-E between I-E groups.

Neuman-Keuls analysis of these

data indicated that internal subjects were significantly
less dogmatic than external subjects and that both internal
and moderate subjects had a significantly higher level of
S-E than external subjects.

In addition to this, a near-

significant increase in S-E occurred independent of condition and level of I-E.
A fourth analysis of variance performed on the
pretest and posttest skills scores of the experimental I
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Table 14
Mean I-E, S-E, and Dg Interaction Pretest
and Posttest Skill Scores

Internal
(N=l9)

High S-E
(N-12)
Low S-E
(N=7}

High S-E
(N=8)
Moderate
(N=lO)
Low S-E
(N=2}

High S-E
(N=3)
External
(N=l6)
Low S-E
(N=l3)

N

Pretest

Post test

High Dg

(4)

2.63

2.81

Low Dg

(8)

2.96

3.85

High Dg

(4)

2.60

3.59

Low Dg

(3)

2.81

3.72

High Dg

(4)

3.13

3.89

Low Dg

( 4)

2.88

4.10

High Dg

Il)

2.06

4.22

Low Dg

(1)

3.03

3.36

High Dg

(2)

3.00

4.17

Low Dg

(1)

2.75

3.00

High Dg

( 8)

2.86

3.68

Low Dg

(5)

2.62

3.09
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Table 15
Neuman-Keuls Post-hoc Analysis of S-E Pretest
and Posttest Mean Skill Scores
S-E Groups

2
Means

Pretest Low S-E (2)

2.66

Pretest High S-E (1)

2.89

Posttest High S-E (3)

3.64

Posttest Low S-E

3.76

*p=.05
**p=.Ol

2.66

1
2.89
.23*

3
3.64

4
3.76

.98**

1.10**

.75**

.87**
.12
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subjects indicated that a very highly significant improvement in interpersonal skills occurred between testings in
all belief groups.

Furthermore, this analysis indicated

a near-significant interaction between S-E level on change
in skills.

A Neuman-Keuls analysis of this result in-

dicated not only a significant increase in skills for both
S-E groups at posttest but also that low S-E subjects had
a lower level of social skills than high S-E subjects at
pretest.
Thus, while the first, third, eighth, and ninth
hypotheses of this study were confirmed, the data does
not support the remaining hypotheses.

More specifically,

these results are summarized according to the hypotheses
of this study as follows:
1.

Participants in a human relations training

program (experimental I condition) showed a significant
increase in their interpersonal skills.
2.

At pretest, the external group of experimental

I subjects did not have a significantly lower level of
interpersonal skills than the internal group of experimental I subjects.
3.

At pretest, the low S-E experimental I sub-

jects had a near-significantly lower level of interpersonal
skills than high S-E experimental I subjects.
4.

At pretest, the high Dg experimental I sub-

jects did not have a significantly lower level of inter-
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personal skills than the low Dg experimental I
5.

~ubjects.

At posttest, the internal experimental I

subjects did not show a greater increase in interpersonal
skills than the external experimental I subjects.
6.

At posttest, the high S-E experimental I

subjects did not show a greater increase in interpersonal
skills than the low S-E experimental I subjects.
7.

At posttest, the low Dg experimental I sub-

jects did not show a greater increase in interpersonal
skills than the high Dg experimental I subjects.
8.

Internal subjects were found to have signif-

icantly lower Dg scale scores than external subjects.
9.

Internal and moderate subjects were found to

have significantly higher S-E scale scores than external
subjects.
10.

At posttest, experimental I and II subjects

did not score significantly lower on the Dg scale than
control I and II subjects.
11.

At posttest, the experimental I and II sub-

jects did not score significantly higher on the S-E scale
than control I and II subjects.
12.

At posttest, the experimental I and II ex-

ternal subjects did not become significantly more internal
than control I and II subjects.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Skills Data
The results of the skills training data strongly
confirm the first hypothesis of this study.

Namely, human

relations training, as advocated by Egan and Carkhuff, does
affect a positive increase in the experimental I subjects'
interpersonal skills, as measured by trainers'ratings.

In

addition to this, the results also provide some tentative
support of the third hypothesis of this study, that is, at
pretest low S-E subjects' scores were somewhat lower than
high S-E subjects.

However, these same data fail to con-

firm all the other skills hypotheses.

Specifically, the

various levels of I-E, S-E, and Dg failed to significantly
differentiate skills improvement, and only S-E appears to
have somewhat of an influence on pretest skills level (see
Table 12) •
In regards to the highly significant change in
rated behavior, pretest means in T.able 12 indicated that
the experimental I subjects, regardless of level of I-E,
S-E, and Dg, all tended to interact with others in the
"good advice" level of communication (see Appendices A and B)
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prior to skills training.

At this level, they would tend

to respond to others with advice and would rarely communicate a minimal understanding of others.

However, at post-

test, this pattern of communication changed significantly
for all experimental I groups.

Behaviorally, after skills

training, the experimental I subjects would be much more
likely to communicate at the "interchangeable" level of
communication.

At this new level, they would be likely to

accurately respond to others' thoughts and feelings with
real warmth and genuine understanding.
As mentioned above, most of the pretest and all of
the

posttest skills-belief system hypothesis were not sup-

ported by the data.

Several factors may have contributed

to this failure to find

significan-c~.

It is possible that

subtle differences in the interpersonal functioning of the
various belief groups were not detected by the behavioral
rating scale, while a gross change in the overall level of
skills was.
tween the

Therefore, failure to detect differences be-

var~~usgroups

might be an artifact of insensitive

instrumentation.
Similarly, the three scales used to assess I-E,
S-E, and Dg are all measures of general attitudes and beliefs.

As such, these scales may show modest correlations

across a wide range of situations, but fail to make accurate predictions of behavior in more specific situations.
In other words, the specific interpersonal skills which
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were rated may not have been mediated by the general attitudes and beliefs assessed.
However, it is also possible that the data are
accurately reflecting a lack of difference between the
various groups.

Using Piagetian terminology, Wachtel

{1973) has argued that normal subjects are more likely to
accomodate themselves to their environment than are "disturbed" individuals who are likely to act in an "overassimilat~d"

manner.

It is therefore possible that for the

normal subjects in this study that their assimilated belief
systems did not differentially mediate their interpersonal
behavior.

Furthermore, given the "demand characteristics"

of the experimental I condition, any personality differences may have been washed out by the subjects' accomodations to the skills training.

This is not to say that per-

sonality differences in interpersonal behavior may not have
existed between the various groups in non-training situations but rather that all groups adapted to a rather
stimulating environment.
In other words, while it might be fair to assume
that the increase in interpersonal functioning would likely
lead to an overall improvement in the subjects' interpersonal relationships {see Carkhuff and Berenson, 1976),
this is not necessarily the case.

It is possible that even

though all the experimental I groups have the same level of
skills, if a subject believes that in most situations those
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skills will have little influence on his or her environment,
he or she may not use his/her skills in non-training
situations.

Therefore, while in the training situation

individual differences may become suppressed, in nontraining situations belief system differences may emerge.
While there was apparently significant improvement
in the rated interpersonal functioning of the experimental
I subjects, due to the quasi-experimental design used as
well as some methodological flaws, the validity of these
results may be questioned.

Specifically, because skills

data was only collected on the experimental I subjects, it
can only be assumed that the subjects under the other conditions were drawn from the same population with respect to
their level of interpersonal skills.

Furthermore, it can

only be assumed that the subjects in the control groups did
not experience a comparable change in either their interpersonal or helping skills and that the experimental II
subjects did experience a comparable increase in their helping skills.

Because of this lack of data, it is not pos-

sible to unequivocally attribute the change in level of
skills to training rather than to various confounds such as
self-selection.
One answer to this question is that despite the
validity of this criticism, the effectiveness of this
training approach has been repeatedly demonstrated (see
Carkhuff, 1969a,b; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1976).

Given this
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demonstrated effectiveness, it seems reasonable that the
above-mentioned assumptions are valid.
Another criticism, that might be made of the
methodology used, is that the subjects may have been taught
to take the test.

That is, in fact, what

ac~ually

happens.

The behavioral scale used to evaluate interpersonal skills
was constructed to pick up what was actually taught during
training.

Since the experimental I subjects were trained

in the very skills assessed by the behavioral scale, they
were expected to and actually did show a marked improvement on the posttest.
While there is also some merit to this criticism,
Carkhuff (1969a,b) has shown that the skills measured by
his scales actually are observable in the subjects' real
interactions with others.

In other words, Carkhuff's

scales appear to validly measure skills that are transferred
to real life situations as a result of training.

Thus, it

can be argued that the rating scale provides a valid assessment of the effectiveness of training.
Another and potentially more serious problem with
the skills data has to do with scoring.

While the trainers

were unaware of the specific hypotheses of this study, they
did know that they were making pretest and posttest assessments of their own groups.

Furthermore, as raters familiar

with this approach, they probably were aware that an increase in skills would be expected.

Therefore, as trainers
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of the very groups that they were rating, one may validly
argue that the trainers may have been biased, that is, the
trainers might have a personal investment in seeing improvement in their trainees' skills.

In other words, the

only irnporvernent in the subjects' interpersonal skills may
have been in the minds of the trainer-raters and not in the
subjects' actual behavior.
While this is a very valid argument, and while
having trainers rate their own groups may seriously cornpromise the validity of the results of this study, the
inter-judge reliability data tends to undercut this
criticism.

Specifially, in all of the training groups (see

Table 11) the Spearman rank order correlations were significant at either the .01 or.OS level with the mean rho
correlation of .96 for the six groups.

This level of

reliability indicates excellent agreement between independent trainer assessments, which would tend to indicate that
the data was validly reflecting an actual change in social
skills.
In sum, despite some design and methodological
problems, it seems safe to conclude that the significant
rated improvement in social skills most probably represents
a valid assessment of actual behavior change.

However,

with one exception, the three measures of belief generally
failed to differentiate skills level and rate of improvement.

This may be due to the general nature of the scales
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used.

Whether these hypotheses would be supported with

more specific measures needs to be determined.

Parentheti-

cally, and in support of the general vs. specific interpretation, the one belief system hypothesis which was supported involved the S-E scale which contains several items
which deal specifically with interpersonal relationships.
This general vs. specific issue will be further discussed
in the next section.
Belief System Data
Two general categories of results can be seen in
the belief system data.

The first category deals with the

significant results which deal with the structure of belief
systems.

The second category of results which are non-

significant involve changes in that structure.
Specifically, Table 6 and 9 show that internal subjects relative to their more external counterparts report a
significantly lower level of Dg and a significantly higher
level of S-E.

These results confirm the eigth and ninth

hypotheses of this study as well as providing additional
support to the validity of the I-E, Dg and S-E constructs.
That is, these results conform with theoretical expectations regarding belief system structure.

People who tend

to believe that they are in control of their lives also
tend to not only think well of themselves, but also tend to
think in a relatively openminded fashion.

People who tend
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to believe that they are not in relative control of their
lives tend to think poorly of themselves as well as tend
to think in a relatively rigid and closeminded fashion.
While the above-mentioned skills training data
indicated that a highly significant change in behavior
occurred, the belief system data does not show a comparable
change in belief system structure.

Specifically, Tables

3 and 5 indicate that no significant changes occurred in
either I-E or Dg.

While, Table 8 indicates that a near-

significant change in S-E.
pendent of condition.

This change occurred inde-

In other words, skills training

did not appear to result in a significant change in belief systems.
There are several possible explanations for this
lack of significant belief system change despite significant behavior change.

One possible explanation for the

failure to find significant belief system change may be
related to the notion of "orders of abstraction" {Korsybinski, 1933).

As mentioned above, all three belief

system scales are measures of generalized factors and are
therefore by definition non-specific.

It is therefore

possible that skills training may have effected some very
specific cognitions that the subjects had without significantly influencing more global or generalized beliefs.
If we were to think of an individual's belief system as
being hierarchically organized as suggested by Rosenberg
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(1979) and Rokeach (1960, 1968, 1973), than specific cognitions and general cognitions would represent different
"levels of abstraction."

Thus while skills training may

have had an immediate effect on some specific concrete
level, this effect may not have effected a change on a
more general level.
A second and somewhat related explanation has to
do with the process of generalization.

Spiegel has sug-

gested that a "ripple effect" occurs when individuals
after experiencing mastery in one area of their life, feel
motivated to start making significant changes in other
areas of their life (Spiegel & Linn, 1969).

Given that

the experimental I subjects experienced a significant increase in interpersonal functioning in the training situation, it is likely to take some time to generalize those
changes across different areas of their lives.

Further-

more, assuming that skills training effected situationspecific cognitions and that it will take time to generalize the new level of skills across situations, it is also
likely to take time to affect generalized or cross-situational beliefs.

More simply, given a lag between behavior

change and resultant belief system change, it may take
subjects lonc;·er to change cross-situational beliefs than
more situation-specific ones.
Another way to interpret the data is that it may
be accurately reflecting the stability of the subjects'
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belief systems and that in point of fact, there was no
change.

One of the presuppositions of this study has been

that lasting change is not automatic and that there are
likely to be systemic forces of checks and balances which
may resist change.

One "dynamic" explanation of this re-

sistance has been offered by cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957}.

If a person behaves in a way that con-

flicts with his/her beliefs and if there is insufficient
external justification for this behavior, then he/she will
experience dissonance and feel motivated to change his/her
beliefs to conform with his/her behavior.

Given this, it

is possible that despite significant behavior change, the
experimental subjects may have been able to attribute this
change to external factors and thereby avoid changing their
beliefs.
A related "dynamic" reason for the failure to find
a significant change in belief is also related to resistance.

Davis (1970} distinguished between two groups

of external subjects--"defensive externals" and "congruent externals."

The former group espouses an external

belief but act like internals, while the latter group's
behavior coincides with their external expectancy.

Davis

suggests that the "defensive external" apparently while
striving for success like an internal defend themselves
against responsibility for failure by espousing an external
belief.

If therefore seems possible that one factor in-
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volved in not finding a significant change in the I-E
scores of the external subjects, despite their significant
change in social skills, might be due to their resistance
to acknowledging greater responsibility for possible
failure.

Somewhat similar arguments have been suggested

by Epstein (1973) in regards to the consistency of S-E
and by Ehlrich and Lee (1969) in regards to Dg.
A final factor which may be related to a failure
to find a significant change in belief system may be related to interpersonal "resistance."

From the literature

on the three belief system components, it was shown that
significant others play an important role in the development of the belief system.

However, in addition to play-

ing an important role in its development, significant
others also play an important role in the maintenance of
the belief systems.

It is therefore possible that another

factor involved in the failure to find a significant change
in belief was due, in part, to the "resistance" of significant others.

That is, within the context of established

relationships, certain behavioral patterns may be maintained and reinforced while deviance from those patterns
may be resisted and punished (see Bandler, Grindler, &
Satir, 1976; Haley, 1963, 1973, 1976; Mash, Hamerlynck,

& Handy, 1976; Mash, Handy, & Hamerlynck, 1976).

Because

of this possible resistance, the generalization of the
newly developed social skills to non-training situations
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may be impeded while the stability of established interpersonal patterns as well as the structure of the belief
system may be maintained.
Carkhuff (Carkhuff & Berenson, 1976) has suggested
that while interpersonal skills are important, they may be
insufficient to help some people to fully develop their
human potential.

He recommends training in other areas of

life such as physical and intellectual skills development.
This is in line with Lazarus'

(1976) multi-modal hypothesis

that the more modalities that are incorporated into a
treatment program, the better the outcome.
Another presupposition of this study has been that
a complex interdependent relationship exists between environmental, behavioral, cognitive, and biological variables.

What the data may be indicating is that skills

training alone, may be insufficient to lead to a significant change in the subjects' belief systems.

What might

be needed to effect lasting significant belief system change
may be the incorporation of additional modalities into the
training process.

This expansion of the focus of train-

ing might increase the impact of training on the network
of interdependent variables.
Parenthetically, it might be added that while the
external subjects under the experimental I and II conditions did not make a significant change in I-E (see
Table 3), by inspection of Table 2, it can be seen that
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their posttest means changed in the predicted direction and
their mean change scores were greater than the external
subjects under the control I and II conditions.

In re-

gards to Dg, although there was no significant change in
Dg levels under any condition (see Table 5), Table 4 indicates that the experimental subjects' posttest means
and mean change scores moved more in the predicted direction than those of the control subjects.

Similarly with

the S-E data, while a near-significant change in S-E occurred independent of the subjects' condition (see Table 8),
by inspection of Table 7, it can be seen that the posttest
means and mean change scores of the experimental I and II
subjects moved more in the predicted direction than the
control I and II subjects' scores.

It is important to

stress that while none of these differences were significant and may be due to chance, they were in the predicted
direction and may be reflecting the relative though insufficient positive effect of skills training on the subjects' belief systems.
In regards to the two categories of belief system
data, the results on structural aspects provide very strong
evidence for the internal consistency of belief systems.
That is, the different levels of I-E, Dg, and S-E tend to
cluster together according to theoretical expectations.
However, with one exception, none of the change in belief
system hypotheses were confirmed.

While the reasons for

98
this stability are not clear, several possible factors
were suggested.

It appears that while skills training

is effective in influencing behavioral change, it may not
be sufficient to make significant changes in belief systems or, at least, it may take longer to make a significant shift in generalized beliefs than anticipated within
the design of this research.
Summary and Conclusions
The results of this study tend to generate more
questions than answers.

The data indicates that inter-

personal skills training resulted in a significant increase

in social functioning.

In addition to this, the internal

consistency of belief systems was also supported.

How-

ever, the three assessed components of belief systems do
not appear to differentially mediate interpersonal functioning.

Moreover, skills training does not appear suf-

ficient to influence those three components.
Although these results tend to indicate that significant behavior change does not lead to significant belief system change, because of various design and methodological factors, this conclusion may not be valid.

To

clarify some of the issues raised in this study, future
studies might include more situation-specific measures of
belief as well as more global scales.

This would help

answer the "orders of abstraction" question as well as
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further explore the structural and change aspects of belief systems.

In addition to this, a long-term posttest

assessment would not only further probe the relationship
between change and stability but might also settle the insufficient time issue.

Some measure of interpersonal be-

havior in non-training situations may also serve to
clarify the relationship between behavior and belief.

By

the same token, some assessment of interpersonal relationships and the reactions of significant others to increased
social functioning may shed some light on the relationship
between interpersonal systems, belief systems, and behavior change.

Finally, training groups which vary in the

number of modalities that they focused on might facilitate
understanding of what might constitute a sufficient intervention.
The experimenter would like to suggest that there
are no panaceas and that no one approach to training or
treatment is likely to be totally sufficient.

Given the

proposed network of complex interdependent relationships
and the ecological nature of the change process, it is
probably better to make direct interventions at the nodal
point of any system.

That is, the place at which the

maximum nunber of functions essential to the existence of
the system converge, and which, if modified, result in
maximum systemic change (Bertalanffy, 1968).

In other

words, if the nodal point within a particular system
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happened to be the individual's belief system then a
cognitively oriented approach might be stressed.

If,

however, the nodal point happened to be in some other
modality then interventions could be directed at that site.
The importance of this, is that by increasing our awareness of the significant processes that are involved in the
maintenance and change of any system, we, as people-helpers,
can make more effective interventions, and thereby help
ourselves and others to fully utilize our human resources.
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APPENDIX A

SCALES FOR ASSESSMENT OF INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONING *
SCALE 1
EMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first
person either do not attend or detract significantly from
the verbal and behavioral expressions of the second person(s)
in that they communicate significantly less of the second
person's feelings than the second person has communicated
himself.
Examples:

The first person communicates no awareness of
even the most obvious, expressed surface feelings
of the second person. The first person may be
bored or uninterested or simply operating from a
preconceived frame of reference which totally excluded that of the other person(s).

In summary, the first person does everything but express that he is listening, understanding, or being sensitive
to even the feelings of the other person in such a way to
detract significantly from the communications of the second
person.
Level 2
While the first person responds to the expressed
feelings of the second person(s), he does so in such a way
that he subtracts noticeable affect from the communications
of the second person.
Examples:

The first person may communicate some awareness
of obvious surface feelings of the second person,
but his communications drain off a level of the af·fect and distort the level of meaning. The first
person may communicate his own ideas of what may

*From

Car.khuff (1969b).
122

123

be going on, but these are not congruent with the
expressions of the second person.
In summary, the first person tends to respond to
other than what the second person is expressing or indicatin~
Level 3
The expressions of the first person in response to
the expressed feelings of the second person(s) are essentially interchangeable with those of the second person in
that they express essentially the same affect and meaning.
Example:

The first person responds with accurate understanding of the surface feelings of the second
person but may not respond to or may misinterpret
the deeper feelings.

In summary, the first person is responding so as to
neither subtract from nor add to the expressions of the
second person; but he does not respond accurately to how
that person really feels beneath the surface feelings.
Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The responses of the first person add noticeably to
the expressions of the second person(s) in such a way as to
express feelings a level deeper than the second person was
able to express himself.
Example:

The facilitator communicates his understanding of
the expressions of the second person at a level
deeper than they were expressed, and thus enables
the second person to experience and/or express
feelings he was unable to express previously.

In summary, the facilitator's responses add deeper
feeling and meaning to the expressions of the second person.
Level 5
The first person's responses add significantly to
the feeling and meaning of the expressions of the second
person (s) in Sl1.ch a way as to (1) accurately express feelings levels below what the person himself was able to express
or (2) in the event of on going deep self-exploration on the
second person's part, to be fully with him in his deepest
moments.
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Example:

The facilitator responds with accuracy to all of
the person's deeper as well as surface feelings.
He is "together" with the second person or "tuned
in" on his wave length. The facilitator and the
other person might proceed together to explore
previously unexplored areas of human existence.

In summary, the facilitator is responding with a
full awareness of who the other person is and a comprehensive and accurate empathic understanding of his deepest
feelings.

SCALE 2
THE COMMUNICATION OF RESPECT IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the first
person communicate a clear lack of respect (or negative regard) for the second person(s).
Example:

The first person communicates to the second person
that the second person's feelings and experiences
are not worthy of consideration or that the second
person is not capable of acting constructively.
The first person may become the sole focus of
evaluation.

In summary, in many ways the first person communicates total lack of respect for the feelings, experiences,
and potentials of the second person.
Level 2
The first person responds to the second person in
such a way as to communicate little respect for the feelings, and potentials of the second person.
Example:

The first person may respond mechanically or passively or ignore many of the feelings of the
second person.

In summary, in many ways the first person displays
a lack of respect or concern for the second person's feelings, experiences, and potentials.
Level 3
The first person communicates a positive respect and
concern for the second person's feelings, experiences, and
potentials.
Example:

The first person communicates respect and concern
for the second person's ability to express himself
and to deal constructively with his life situation.
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In summary, inmanyways the first person communicates
that who the second person is and what he does matter to the
first person. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of
facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator clearly communicates a very deep
respect and concern for the second person.
Example:

The facilitator's responses enables the second
person to feel free to be himself and to experience being valued as an individual.

In summary, the facilitator communicates a very deep
caring for the feelings, experiences, and potentials of the
second person.
Level 5
The facilitator communicates the very deepest respect for the second person's worth as a person and his
potential as a free individual.
Example:

The facilitator cares very deeply for the human
potentials of the second person.

In summary, the facilitator is committed to the
value of the other person as a human being.

SCALE 3
FACILITATIVE GENUINENESS IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The first person's verbalizations are clearly unrelated to what he is feeling at the moment, or his only genuine responses are negative in regard to the second person(s)
and appear to have a totally destructive effect upon the
second person.
Example:

The first person may be defensive in his interaction with the second person(s) and this defensiveness may be demonstrated in the content of his
words or his voice quality. Where he is defensive
he does not employ his reaction as a basis for
potentially valuable inquiry into the relationship.

In summary, there is evidence of a considerable discrepancy between the inner experiencing of the first person(s) and his current verbalizations. Where there is no
discrepancy, the first person's reactions are employed
solely in a destructive fashion.
Level 2
The first person's verbalizations are slightly unrelated to what he is feeling at the moment, or when his responses are genuine they are negative in regard to the second person; the first person does not appear to know how to
employ his negative reactions constructively as a basis for
inquiry into the relationship.
Example:

The first person may respond to the second person(s) in a "professional" manner that has a rehearsed quality or a quality concerning the way a
helper "should" respond in that situation.

In summary, the first person is usually responding
according to his prescribed role rather than expressing what
he personally feels or means. When he is genuine his responses are negative and he is unable to employ them as a
basis for further inquiry.
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Level 3
The first person provides no "negative" cues between
what he says and what he feels, but he provides no positive
clues to indicate a really genuine response to the second
person(s).
Example:

The first person may listen and follow the second
person(s) but commits nothing more of himself.

In summary, the first person appears to make appropriate responses that do not seen insincere but that do not
reflect any real involvement either. Level 3 constitutes
the minimal level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator presents some positive cues indicating a genuine response (whether positive or negative) in
a nondestructive manner to the second person(s).
Example:

The facilitator's expressions are congruent with
his feelings, although he may be somewhat hesitant
about expressing them fully.

In summary, the facilitator responds with many of
his own feelings, and there is no doubt as to whether he
really means what he says. He is able to employ his responses, whatever their emotional content, as a basis for
further inquiry into the relationship.
Level 5
The facilitator is freely and deeply himself in a
nonexploitative relationship with the second person(s).
Example:

The facilitator is completely spontaneous in his
interaction and open to experiences of all types,
both pleasant and hurtful. In the event of hurtful responses the facilitator's comments are employed constructively to open a further area of
inquiry for both the facilitator and the second
person.

In summary, the facilitator is clearly being himself
and yet employing his own genuine responses constructively.

SCALE 4
FACILITATIVE SELF-DISCLOSURE IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The first person actively attempts to remain detached from the second person(s) and discloses nothing about
his own feelings or personality to the second person(s), or
if he does disclose himself, he does so in a way that is not
tuned to the second person's general progress.
Example:

The first person may attempt, whether awkwardly or
skillfully to divert the second person's attention
from focusing upon personal questions concerning
the first person, or his self-disclosures may be
ego shattering for the second person(s) and may
ultimately cause him to lose faith in the first
person.

In summary, the first person actively attempts to
remain ambiguous and an unknown quantity to the second person(s), or if he is self-disclosing, he does so solely out
of his own needs and is oblivious to the needs of the second person(s).
Level 2
The first person, while not always appearing
actively to avoid self-disclosures, never volunteers personal information about himself.
Example:

The first person may respond briefly to direct
questions from the client about himself; however,
he does so hesitantly and never provides more information about himself than the second person(s)
specifically requests.

In summary, the second person(s) either does not ask
about the personality of the first person, or, if he does,
the barest minimum of brief, vague, and superficial responses are offered by the first person.
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Level 3
The first person volunteers personal information
about himself which may be in keeping with the second person's interests, but this information is often vague and indicates little about the unique character of the first person.
Example:

While the first person volunteers personal information and never gives the impression that he does
not wish to disclose more about himself, nevertheless, the content of his verbalizations is generally centered upon his reactions to the second
person(s) and his ideas concerning their interaction.

In summary, the first person may introduce more abstract, personal ideas in accord with the second person's
interests, but these ideas do not stamp him as a unique person. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of facilitative
interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator freely volunteers information about
his personal ideas, attitudes, and experiences in accord
with the second person's interests and concerns.
Example:

The facilitator may discuss personal ideas in both
depth and detail, and his expressions reveal him
to be a unique individual.

In summary, the facilitator is free and spontaneous
in volunteering personal information about himself, and in
so doing may reveal in a constructive fashion quite intimate
material about his own feelings, and beliefs.
Level 5
The facilitator volunteers very intimate and often
detailed material about his own personality, and in keeping
with the second person's needs may express information that
might be extremely embarrassing under different circumstances or if revealed by the second person to an outsider.
Example:

The facilitator gives the impression of holding
nothing back and of disclosing his feelings and
ideas fully and completely to the second person(s).
If some of his feelings are negative concerning the
second person(s), the facilitator employes them
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constructively as a basis for an open-ended inquiry.
In summary, the facilitator is operating in a constructive fashion at the most intimate levels of selfdisclosure.

SCALE 5
PERSONALLY RELEVANT CONCRETENESS OR SPECIFICITY
OF EXPRESSION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES:
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT
Level 1
The first person leads or allows all discussion with
the second person(s) to deal only with vague and anonymous
generalities.
Example:

The first person and the second person discuss
everything on strictly an abstract and highly intellectual level.

In summary, the first person makes no attempt to
lead the discussion into the realm of personally relevant
specific situations and feelings.
Level 2
The first person frequently leads or allows even discussions of material personally relevant to the second person(s) to be dealt with on a vague and abstract level.
Example:

The first person and the second person may discuss
the "real" feelings but they do so at an abstract,
intellectualized level.

In summary, the first person does not elicit discussions of most personally relevant feelings and experiences
in specific and concrete terms.
Level 3
The first person at times enables the second person(s) to discuss personally relevant materials in specific
and concrete terminology.
Example:

The first person will make it possible for the
discussion with the second person(s) to center
directly around most things that are personally
important to the second person(s), although there
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will continue to be areas not dealt with concretely
and areas in which the second person does not develop fully in specificity.
In summary, the first person sometimes guides the
discussions into consideration of personally relevant specific and concrete instances, but these are not always fully
developed. Level 3 constitutes the minimal level of facilitative functioning.
Level 4
The facilitator is frequently helpful in enabling
the second person(s) to fully develop in concrete and specific terms almost all instances of concern.
Example:

The facilitator is able on many occasions to guide
the discussion to specific feelings and experiences of personally meaningful material.

In summary, the facilitator is very helpful in enabling the discussion to center around specific and concrete
instances of most important and personally relevant feelings
and experiences.
Level 5
The facilitator is always helpful in guiding the discussion, so that the second person(s) may discuss fluently,
directly, and completely specific feelings and experiences.
Example:

The first person involves the second person in
discussion of specific feelings, situations, and
events, regardless of their emotional content.

In summary, the facilitator facilitates a direct expression of all personally relevant feelings and experiences
in concrete and specific terms.

SCALE 6
CONFRONTATION IN INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES:
A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior (ideal
versus real self, insight versus action, helper versus
helpee's experiences).
Example:

The helper may simply ignore all helpee discrepancies by passively accepting them.

In summary, the helper simply disregards all of
those discrepancies in the helpee's behavior that might be
fruitful areas for consideration.
Level 2
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard the discrepancies in the helpee's behavior.
Example:

The helper, although not explicitly accepting
these discrepancies, may simply remain silent concerning most of them.

In summary, the helper disregards the discrepancies
in the helpee's behavior, and, thus, potentially important
areas of inquiry.
Level 3
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper,
while open to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior, do not
relate directly and specifically to these discrepancies.
Example:

The helper may simply raise questions without
pointing up the diverging directions of the possible answers.

In summary, while the helper does not disregard discrepancies in the helpee's behavior, he does not point up
the directions of these discrepancies. Level 3 constitutes
the minimum level of facilitative interpersonal functioning.
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Level 4
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
attend directly and specifically to the discrepancies in the
helpee's behavior.
Example:

The helper confronts the helpee directly and explicitly with discrepancies in the helpee's behavior.

In summary, the helper specifically addresses himself to discrepancies in the helpee's behavior.
Level 5
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
are keenly and continually attuned to the discrepancies in
the helpee's behavior.
Example:

The helper confronts the helpee with helpee discrepancies in a sensitive and perceptive manner
whenever they appear.

In summary, the helper does not neglect any potentially fruitful inquiry into the discrepancies in the
helpee's behavior.

SCALE 7
IMMEDIACY OF RELATIONSHIP IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard the content and affect of the helpee's expressions
that have the potential for relating to the helper.
Example:

The helper may simply ignore all helpee communications, whether direct or indirect, that deal with
the helper-helpee relationship.

In summary, the helper simply disregards all of
those helpee messages that are related to the helper.
Level 2
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
disregard most of the helpee expressions that have the
potential for relating to the helper.
Example:

Even if the helpee is talking about helping personnel in general, the helper may, in general, remain silent or 'just not relate the content to himself.

In summary, the helper appears to choose to disregard most of those helpee messages that are related to the
helper.
Level 3
The verbal and behavior expressions of the helper,
while open to interpretations of immediacy, do not relate
what the helpee is saying to what is going on between the
helper and the helpee in the immediate moment.
Example:

The helper may make literal responses to or reflections on the helpee's expressions or otherwise
open-minded responses that refer to no one specifically but that might refer to the helper.
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In summary, while the helper does not extend the
helpee's expressions to immediacy, he is not closed to such
interpretations. Level 3 constitutes the minimum level of
facilitative interpersonal functioning.
Level 4
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
appear cautiously to relate the helpee's expressions
directly to the helper-helpee relationship.
Example:

The helper attempts to relate the helpee's responses to himself, but he does so in a tentative
manner.

In summary, the helper relates the helpee's responses
to himself in an open, cautious manner.
Level 5
The verbal and behavioral expressions of the helper
relate the helpee's expressions directly to the helperhelpee relationship.
Example:

The helper in a direct and explicit manner relates
the helpee's expressions to himself.

In summary, the helper is not hesitant in making
explicit interpretations of the helper-helpee relationship.'

SCALE 8
HELPEE SELF-EXPLORATION IN INTERPERSONAL
PROCESSES:

A SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT

Level 1
The second person does not discuss personally relevant material, either because he has had no opportunity to
do such or because he is actively evading the discussion
even when it is introduced by the first person.
Example:

The second person avoids any self-descriptions or
self-exploration or direct expression of feelings
that would lead him to reveal himself to the first
person.

In summary, for a variety of possible reasons the
second person does not give any evidence of self-exploration.
Level 2
The second person responds with discussion to the introduction of personally relevant material by the first person but does so in a mechanical manner and without the demonstration of emotional feelings.
Example:

The second person simply discusses the material
without exploring the significance or the meaning
of the material or attempting further exploration
of that feeling in an effort to uncover related
feelings or material.

In summary, the second person responds mechanically
and remotely to the introduction of personally relevant
material by the first person.
Level 3
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions
of personally relevant material but does so in a mechanical
manner and without the demonstration of emotional feeling.
Example:

The emotional remoteness and mechanical manner of
the discussion give the discussion a quality of
being rehearsed.
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In summary, the second person introduces personally
relevant material but does so without spontaneity or emotional proximity and without an inward probing to discover
new feelings and experiences.
Level 4
The second person voluntarily introduces discussions
of personally relevant material with both spontaneity and
emotional proximity.
Example:

The voice quality and other characteristics of the
second person are very much "with" the feelings
and other personal materials that are being
verbalized.

In summary, the second person introduces personally
relevant discussions with spontaneity and emotional proximity
but without a distinct tendency toward inward probing to
discover new feelings and experiences.
Level 5
The second person actively and spontaneously engages
in an inward probing to discover new feelings and experiences about himself and his world.
Example:

The second person is searching to discover new
feelings concerning himself and his world even
though at the moment he may perhaps be doing so
fearfully and tentatively.

In summary, the second person is fully and actively
focusing upon himself and exploring himself and his world.

APPENDIX B

Rating Guide for the Interpersonal Skills Scale *
Sample Statement:

"I'm so down and I don't even know why
• • • I mean, I shouldn't be down just
because • • • (pause) there's just no
reason for it."

Response Classification Level

Rating

(refer to above statement for all examples)

1.

Cliche Response: Not related to other's statement.
e.g., "I know lots of people who get sad feelings
too."
Somewhat related to other's
statement.
e.g., "What do you think causes people to get
depressed?"

1.0

Cliche Response:

2.

3.

1.5

Advice Response: Poor advice: no understanding.
e.g., "You should think of the good things in
your life."

2.0

Advice Response: Good advice: no understanding.
e.g., "You know what's on your mind. Just say it!"

2.5

Interchangeable Response:

Simple reflective with
understanding shown.
e.g., "You• re feeling down."
Complete understanding
of feeling and message
of other.
e.g., "You're pretty down and you just don't know
why."

3.0

Interchangeable Response:

4.

High understanding1 beginning
initiation.
e.g., "You can't let yourself think about the
things that are causing you to feel so bad."

3.5

Additive Response:

High Understanding1 high
initiation.
e.g., "You're feeling really low • • • you have
an idea why • • • but its pretty painful to
think about it.•

4.0

Additive Response:

*'!'his

scale is based on the work of Carkhuff

(1969b).
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APPENDIX C

Interpersonal Skills:

A Rating Scale *

Use the following rating scale to rate interpersonal skills:

1.0 I 1.5 I 2.0 I 2.5 I 3.0 I 3.5 I 4.0 I 4.5 I 5.0 I
Moderately
Minimally
Markedly
Extremely
Subtractive facilitafacilita- Facilitative
tive
tive

Very Subtractive

Self-presentation Skills:
Self-disclosure: Trainee appropriately discloses himself to others with the goal of fostering relationships.
This is done in a sense of mutuality and emerges from
the ongoing context of the relationship.
Concreteness: He deals in specific, concrete feelings
and behavior; he deals in relevant behavior (not "storytelling"); he deals in specific details and specific
instances
Expression of feeling:
He expresses his emotions as
they arise in a constructive non-manipulative manner;
directly communicating his feelings.
Responding Skills:
Primary Accurate Empathy: Trainee communicates an accurate understanding of the feelings, behavior, and experiences which the other person explicitly communicates.
He experiences the "world" of the other and communicates
this understanding.
Genuineness: He responds in a spontaneous, role-free
manner. He is assertive in communicating without being
duly aggressive.
Respect:
(warmth, being "for"): He communicates respect for the other person (especially through his efforts to understand the other person's experience).
He
is unconditional or conditional in his regard as the
phase and content of the relationship demands.

*This

scale is based on the work of Egan (1976).
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Challenge Skills:
Advanced Accurate Empathy: Trainee accurately communicates not only what the other person states and expresses
but also what he implies or leaves unstated or doesn't
clearly express.
Confrontation: He invites the other person to examine
his behavior and its consequences more carefully; he
challenges the strengths rather than the weaknesses of
the other; he points out the discrepancies in the
other's lifestyle.
Immediacy: He explores the here-and-now, the relationship between himself and others, in a direct and constructive manner.

APPENDIX D

THE ROTTER INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LOCUS
OF CONTROL SCALE *
Instructions: Please check the alternative that best describes what happens to you or how you feel.
There are no
right or wrong answers.
1.

A.
B.

2.

A.
B.

3.

A.
B.

4.

A.
B.

5.

A.
B.

6.

A.
B.

7.

A.
B.

Children get into trouble because their parents
punish them too much.
The trouble with most children nowadays is that
their parents are too easy with them.
Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are
partly due to bad luck.
People's misfortunes result from the mistakes
they make.
One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
There will always be wars, no matter how hard
people try to prevent them.
In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes
unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
The idea that teachers are unfair to students is
nonsense.
Most students don't realize the extent to which
their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
Capable people who fail to become leaders have
not taken advantage of their opportunities.
No matter how hard you try some people just don't
like you.
People who can't get others to like them don't
understand how to get along with others.

*From

Rotter (1966).
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8.

A.
B.

9.

A.
B.

10.

A.
B.

11.

A.
B.

12.

A.
B.

13.

A.
B.

14.

A.
---B.

15.

A.
B.

16.

A.
B.

Heredity plays the major role in determining
one's personality.
It is one's experiences in life which determine
what they're like.
I have often found that what is going to happen
will happen.
Trusting to fate has never turned out as well
for me as making a decision to take a definite
course of action.
In the case of the well prepared student there
is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really
useless.
Becoming a success
luck has little or
Getting a good job
the right place at

is a matter of hard work;
nothing to do with it.
depends mainly on being in
the right time.

The average citizen can have an influence in
government decisions.
This world is run by the few people in power,
and there is not much the little guy can do
about it.
When I make plans, I am almost certain that I
can make them work.
It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of
good or bad fortune anyhow.
There are certain people who are just no good.
There is some good in everybody.
In my case getting what I want has little or
nothing to do with luck.
Many times we might just as well decide what to
do by flipping a coin.
Who gets to be boss often depends on who was
lucky enough to be in the right place first.
Getting people to do the right thing depends
upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do
with it.
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17.

A.
B.

18.

A.
B.

As far as world affairs are concerned, most of
us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
By taking an active part in political and social
affairs the people can control world events.
Most people don't realize the extent to which
their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
There really is no such thing as "luck."

19.

A.
---B.

One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20.

A.

It is hard to know whether or not a person
really likes you.
How many friends you have depends upon how nice
a person you are.

B.
21.

A.
B.

22.

A.
B.

23.

A.
B.

24.

A.
B.

25.

A.
B.

26.

A.
B.

In the long run the bad things that happen to us
are balanced by the good ones.
Most misfortunes are the result of lack of
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
With enough effort we can wipe out political
corruption. ·
It is difficult for people to have much control
over the things politicians do in office.
Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive
at the grades they give.
There is a direct connection between how hard I
study and the grades I get.
A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
A good leader makes it clear to everybody what
their jobs are.
Many times I feel that I have little influence
over the things that happen to me.
It is impossible for me to believe that chance
or luck plays an important role in my life.
People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly.
There's not much use in trying too hard to please
people, if they like you, they like you.
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27.

A.
B.

28.

A.
---B.

29.

A.
B.

There is too much emphasis on athletics in high
school.
Team sports are an excellent way to build
character.
What happens to me is my own doing.
Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
In the long run the people are responsible for
bad government on a national as well as on a
local level.

APPENDIX E

THE ROKEACH DOGMATISM SCALE*
Directions:

Please answer all questions. There are no
right or wrong answers.
Select the number
for the response which best represents your
attitude or belief.

+3 Strongly
agree

+2 Moderately
agree

-2 Moderately
disagree

+1 Agree

-1 Disagree

-3 Strongly
disagree

1.

The United States and Russia have just about
nothing in common.

2.

The highest form of government is a democracy and
the highest form of democracy is a government run
by those who are most intelligent.

3.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

4.

It is only natural that a person would have a much
--- better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than
with ideas he opposes.

5.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

6.

Fundamentally, the world we live 1n is a pretty
lonesome place.

7.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

8.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.

9.

It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10.

There is so much to be done and so little time to
do it in.

11.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just
can't stop.

12.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to
*From Rokeach (1960) •
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repeat myself several times to make sure I am being
understood.
13.

In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to
listen to what others are saying.

14.

It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward.

15.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself,
my secret ambition is to become a great man, like
Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

16.

The main thing in life is for a person to want to
do something important.

17.

If given the chance I would do something of great
benefit to the world.

18.

In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers.

19.

There are a number of people I have come to hate
because of the things they stand for.

20.

A man who does not believe in some great cause has
not really lived.

21.

It is only when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

22.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in
this world there is probably only one which is
correct.

23.

A person who gets enthusiastic about too many
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy"
sort of person.

24.

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal
of our own side.

25.

When it comes to differences of opinion in religion
we must be careful not to compromise with those
who believe differently from the way we do.

26.

In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish
if he considers primarily his own happiness.
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27.

The worst crime a person could commit is to attack
publicly the people who believe in the same things
he does.

28.

In times like these it is often necessary to be
more on guard against ideas put out by people or
groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

29.

A group which tolerates too many differences of
opinion among its own members cannot exist for
long.

30.

There are two kinds of people in this world: those
who are for the truth and those who are against the
truth.

31.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

32.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness
is beneath contempt.

33.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't
worth the paper they are printed on.

34.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we
can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or
experts who can be tursted.

35.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
what's going on until one has had a chance to hear
the opinions of those one respects.

36.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are
the same as one's own.

37.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is only the future that counts.

38.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing
at all."

39.

Unfortunately a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems don't
really understand what's going on.

40.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

APPENDIX F

THE REVISED JANIS-FIELD SCALE*
Directions:

e.g. 1--Very
often

Please answer all questions. There are no
right or wrong answers. Place the number in
the blank for each question which best describes your experience or feelings. Wording
for responses should be adjusted to fit each
question.
2--Fairly
often

3--Sometimes

4--0nce in a
great while

5--Practically never
1.

How often do you have the feeling that there is
nothing you can do well?

2.

When you have to talk in front of a class or a
group of people your own age, how afraid or worried
do you usually feel?
(e.g, very afraid)

3.

How often do you worry about whether other people
like to be with you?

4.

How often do you feel self-conscious?

5.

How often are you troubled with shyness?

6.

How often do you feel inferior to most of the
people you know?

7.

Do you ever think that you are a worthless individual?

8.

How much do you worry about how well you get along
with other people?

9.

How often do you feel that you dislike yourself?

10.

Do you ever feel so discouraged with yourself
that you wonder whether anything is worthwhile?

11.

How often do you feel that you have handled yourself well at a social gathering?

12.

How often do you have the feeling that you can do
everything well?

*From Eagley (1967).
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13.

When you talk in front of a class or a group of
people of your own age, how pleased are you with
your performance? (e.g., very pleased)

14.

How comfortable are you when starting a conversation with people whom you don't know?
(e.g., very
comfortable)

15.

How often do you feel that you are a successful
person?

16.

How confident are you that your success in your
future job or career is assured?
(e.g., very
confident)

17.

When you speak in a class discussion how sure of
yourself do you feel?

18.

How sure of yourself do you feel when among
strangers?

19.

How confident do you feel that some day the people
you know will look up to you and respect you?

20.

In general, how confident do you feel about your
abilities?
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